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PREFACE
The subject of this thesis is Major-General the
Baron von Steuben and his role in military events in
Virginia during 1780-1781.

Steuben came south in Novem-

ber 1780 with Major-General Nathanael Greene to help re-form,
re-equip, and re-man the Southern Army.

Finding Virginia

potentially valuable, General Greene detached General
Steuben soon after their arrival with the primary mission
to remain and expedite supplies and manpower southward.
While so engaged, Steuben also assumed a secondary mission
when he found himself, for a time, military commander of the
Continental and state militia forces in Virginia.

His per-

formance from November 1780 until October 1781 with an evaluation of his successes, failures, strengths, and weaknesses
is the central theme examined here.

This thesis is limited

to this period of service which was, in itself, filled with
events that brought him both praise and criticism.
In completing this study, the efforts of many people
must be recognized.

The personnel at the University of

Richmond Library and the Virginia State Library provided
valuable time and advice.

Special thanks go to Terry Long,

Sandra Picchi, Ethel Slonaker, and Tim Heigh of the Virginia
State Library for their invaluable aid.

The friendly assist-

ance of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation Research Archives, the Valentine Museum, especially Michael SanchexSavaadra, and the people of the Virginia Historical Society
Research Library also aided in many ways with my research.

Thanks, too, go to Professor Harry M. Ward,
who acted as my thesis director.

His comments and

criticism contributed immensely to bringing the thesis
to completion.

I wish also to extend my special appre-

ciation to Nita Bender for her long hours spent editing
the text and to Glenda Giddens and Kay Durr for the long
and difficult task of typing the manuscript.

Finally,

I wish to thank my wife and daughter for their concern
and support.
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CHAPTER I
Commander of Virginia Forces
Following the disastrous loss by Major-General
Horatio Gates to British forces at Camden, the American
troops had either been captured or scattered throughout
North and South Carolina.

General George Washington

had received news that General Charles

Lord Cornwallis

intended to pursue the advantage and increase his hold
on the southern states.

Any doubt of this was dispelled

when General Alexander Leslie landed in Virginia in
October 1780.

From the American view it was absolutely

essential that a new commander be sent to reassemble.and
rebuild the troops into a Southern Army which could
oppose moves General Cornwallis would surely make.

To

do this successfully meant providing a commander who
possessed the respect of the people in the South.

Gen-

eral Washing·ton proposed to the Continental Congress
that Major-General Nathanael Greene would be the proper
person to carry out this duty.

Nominated by General

Washington on October 22, 1780 in a letter which was Tead
before the Congress on October 27, General Greene was
confirmed on October 30 and orders were cut appointing
him to command the American Southern Army.
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On October

22, 1780 General Washington wrote to General Greene that:
• • . I also propose to them to send Major General
the Baron De Steuben to the Southward with you; his
talents, knowledge of service, zeal and activity
will make him very useful to you in all respects

and particularly in the formation and regulation of
the raw troops, which will principally compose the
Southern Army.
You will give him a command suited
to his rank; besides employing him as Inspector General. • • • He will take your orders in Philadelphia.2
Major-General Nathanael Greene would command and MajorGeneral the Baron Frederick Wilhelm von Steuben would
form and regulate

the~raw

troops.

On the same day Washington also informed Baron
von Steuben that:
Though • • • sensible how important your services
will be in this quarter; yet as to the Southward,
there is an army to be created, the mass of which
is at present without any formation at all, your
services there will be still more essential; and
. . . I have recommended it to Congress to send
you with General Greene to the Southern Army.3
Whether the army was to be created or rebuilt, the task
ahead was formidable.

The Southern Army's success at

rebuilding would require the experience in organization
and training of Baron von Steuben.
The confidence expressed by General Washington
in his letter was not in the least unfounded.

From the

time of his arrival at Valley Forge on February 23,

1778,

Steuben had been deeply involved in providing military
instruction to the American Army.

Steuben had been

schooled in the Prussian style of military drill while
serving as a captain in the Prussian Army, and he brought
this knowledge with him to America.

To perform these

training responsibilities, General Washington set.up the

2

temporary department of inspection with Steuben at the
head.

Under him were five inspectors who, by working

with the brigade-inspector, were to teach the soldiers.
The improvement this training gave the troops became apparent to General Washington, and he was impressed sufficiently enough to write the Continental Congress on
April 30 asking that Steuben's talents be noted and
official recognition of his position be given.

On May 5,

1778 the Congress formally established the Department of
Inspection, ratified Steuben's appointment as InspectorGeneral and gave him the rank of Major-General. 4

In

1779 Steuben took the procedures he had been using to·
teach the troops and produced a set of regulations for
training and drilling the American troops.

This manual,

first printed in 2,969 copies, would be the standard
throughout the remainder of the war.
On November 3, 1780 Steuben with his commander,
Nathanael Greene, prepared to depart Philadelphia--MajorGeneral Greene to assume command of the Southern Army and
Major-General Steuben to recruit in Virginia.

Assignments

confirmed and orders in hand, they departed Philadelphia
on November 3, 1780 for the

inn~at

Chester, Pennsylvania,

thirteen miles down the Delaware River.5
By November 5 the party arrived at Head of Elk,
Maryland, and by the 12th, at Mount Vernon.
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At some

'

point after November 4, Steuben parted company with
General Greene and went on to Mount Vernon, where he.
enjoyed Mra Washington's hospitality while waiting for
Greene to rejoin the party.6
During the period when Steuben went on to Mount
Vernon, General Greene met with various state officials,
including the Maryland legislature, to improve public
confidence in the struggling Southern Army so necessary
to gain the support of the southern states.

As General

Greene wrote, "the whole southern operations will depend
upon the stores coming from the northward. 7
11

Following a

brief visit with Mrs. Washington, the travelers pressed
on to Fredericksburg, where they arrived on November 14
looking for the inn formerly operated by Virginia BrigadierGeneral George Weedon.8
The remainder of the journey was completed by
November 16, 1780, when the group arrived in Richmond,
Virginia.

During the following six days, the generals

were met by state officials, and took advantage of Governor Jefferson's hospitality.9
During the period from November 16 to November 21,
General Greene's time was filled with letter writing and
conversations aimed at establishing the importance of his
mission to the South with the civil authorities of the
various southern states and the reliance his army would
have upon supplies provided by them.10

4

He likewise made

the decision that Steuben, with his experience in training and organizing, would best aid him by remaining in
Virginia as an intermediary who could expedite support
southward to him.

On November, 20, 1780, therefore, Gen-

eral Greene wrote a letter to Virginia Governor Thomas
Jefferson in which he stated:
I propose to sett out in the morning for Hilsborough,
but shall leave Major Genl. Baron Steuben to command
in this State for the present, and to put things in
the most proper train for forwarding the Reinforcement of Men, and supplies of every Kind to the Southern Army. He will advise with your Excellency.11
An

attachment to this letter was General Greene's

requisition for the Southern Army, the first paragraph of
which provided Baron von Steuben with his immediate instructions:
The state immediately furnish its quota of Troops
agreable to the new Establishment, and that the Men
be supplied with cloathing, Blankets, Arms, and
every Accoutrement necessary for equipping them for
a Winter's Campaign, and that Lawson's Corps, and
Steuben's Brigade of Militia Continue in Service
till the.regular Regiments are formed . . . .
The attachment then went on and called for ·the state to provide a magazine of ten thousand barrels of flour, five
thousand barrels of beef and pork, three thousand head
of cattle, one hundred good wagons with a driver, four
good horses and harness complete to each wagon, two hundred hogshead of rum or brandy and that provisions and
forage be provided at the different places of rendezvous
for receiving recruits.

It would also provide forty

5

artificiers, of whom twelve would be shipwrights or boat
builders, twelve house carpenters, four wheel wrights, six
smiths, three armorers, two saddlers and one harness maker.
Finally, five thousand dollars would also be provided to
defray the contingent expenses of the army. 12

Neither

General Greene nor Baron van Steuben were under any misconceptions as to the ease with which these needs were going
to be met.
General Greene felt he had brought all the pressure to bear that he could for the time being.

All that

remained was to issue the orders necessary to sustain
military operations in Virginia and notify General Washington of the steps taken.

Also on November 20, he issued

instructions on the arrangement of the Virginia line, the
inspection of stores, revitalization of the State Quartermaster General's Office, and notified Major-General Peter
Muhlenberg, Rrevious commander of the Continental forces
in Virginia, to report to Steuben and take his orders.
He then wrote General Washington that, "I think the
legislature will adopt your Excellency's plan for filling
their regiments for the war.

But I foresee very great

difficulties in arranging the officers of the Virginia
line, as there are so many prisoners of the war and such
great discontent among them. 111Y With that General Greene
left Richmond on November 21, 1780, heading for Hillsborough, North Carolina.
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Steuben was not idle during this initial period:
It had been his responsibility to take stock of the
military forces in Virginia in preparation for taking
command.

What he found was very upsetting.

essentials of the military:

The three

organization, manpower, and

material were in complete disarray.14
Steuben began immediately in making changes to
right the chaos which existed.

Some changes were for the

better and some for the worse.

To understand the how and

why, Steuben's motives should be examined.

While he came

to America principally to train and organize troops, he

~

nevertheless had always desired a field command in order
to prove himself and start him down the "road to glory
and great possessions," as he was told by those in
France who had convinced him to come.15

By going with

General Greene, he was getting this opportunity.

The

stop in Virginia, while certainly necessary, was not believed by Steuben as any great obstacle to this goal.
It was a simple case of no organization, no administration,
no training, and insufficient arms.

He felt capable of

solving the problems and turning things around within a
few months; he would then once again be free to join
General Greene and obtain his long-awaited command.16
Henry "Light Horse Harryn- Lee's Corps, given orders to join
General Greene in the South by General Washington on October 22, 1780, together with the troops Steuben would send
from Virginia, should, when the remnants of General Gates'
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army were included, be a worthy fighting force with which
to join.
Steuben, knowing his recruits for the Southern
Army would have to come from the only ready source of
manpower in Virginia, turned his attention to the military forces in Virginia.
three types:

He

discove~ed

they were of

the state militia, under Generals Robert

Lawson and Thomas Nelson;l7 approximately nine hundred
Continental troops who were under General Muhlenberg's
cornrnand; 18 and the State Garrison Regiment, a small unit
used to guard harbors and ports, with a special garrison
in charge of the defense of

officials. 1 ~

govern~ent

buildings and.

In addition to being varied, these forces

were also widely separated--so much so that Steuben wrote
to Governor Jefferson that:
Instead of forwarding Genl. Greene the reinforcements
he Expected, we are Keeping a Number of Corps dispersed about the State, where no Enemy has been these
Eight Days thereby Exposing General Greene with an
inferior force to the Enemy, and exhausting w123t
little provision was Collected in this State.
Steuben selected militia principally from Lawson's
troops to prepare to march southward to reinforce General
Greene and notified Governor Jefferson by letter that they
were to be dispatched on December 2, 1780.

To his sur-

prise he received a resolution of assembly by the Virginia
legislature directing that General Lawson's troops be
discharged. 21

Shown a copy of the resolution by General

Lawson himself, Steuben had no choice but to comply and

8

then seek another source--the Continental troops under
General Muhlenberg.

When Steuben directed four hundred of

the best equipped be detached under Colonel John Green to
reinforce the Southern Army, he found that the officers of
this detachment were unpaid and ill-clothed, with scanty
provisions.

Consequently, they had become discontented

to the point where a paper complaining of ill treatment
by the state was_ written, and the officers expressed their
determination not to march until their grievances were
redressed.

Baron von Steuben went to General Muhlenberg

who spoke to the troops, persuading them to withdraw the
paper, which they did.22
When General greene arrived at the location of
the Southern Army, he was so upset by the appearance and
state of preparedness of the Virginia troops, he complained that no more should be sent in that condition.23
Another delay then was inevitable and it took Colonel
William Davies, Commander of the Continental Depot at
Chesterfield Courthouse several weeks to find enough
muskets and clothing to outfit a detachment of four hundred Continental recruits.24

This provoked Steuben to

write from Petersburg:
I came here Yesterday in full Expectation of sending
off Colo. [John] Greenes Detachment of 400 Men this
Day, and it is with great pain I have to inform.Your
Excellency that so far from being ready to March I
am even fearfull they will not be able to March at
all.
·
Amongst the 400 Men selected . • • about 60 only had
blankets. • • . 25.
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Finally overcoming the major obstacles, the troops
were ready to march on December 14, 1780 in the company
of the three hundred troops of Henry Lee's legion, which
had arrived in Virginia.

They were on their way south as

Washington had ordered in October.

Steuben gave him

twenty-five men to replace a like number lost to desertion
along the way.

Then the total force numbering some seven

hundred Continentals left to join the eight hundred Continentals who comprised the Southern Army. 2 6
need to be sent.

More would

Steuben was responsible for maintaining

certain numbers of troops in the army based on quota
allocations provided to Virginia by the Continental Congress.

On December 16, 1780, Steuben wrote Governor Jef-

ferson from Richmond that "the number required by Congress
is for the Infantry

5448.

Cavalry

For Lee's and Armand's Legion's 50.

844.

Artillery

In all

544.

6886. 1121

In addition to recruiting troops, Steuben also
set out to reorganize the military forces of the state to
provide better internal control, more effective administration, and a better knowledge of the amount of arms and
equipment in the state.

As Steuben wrote:

Under the orders of General Muhlenberg I found about
1100 Men, enlisted for various terms 18 months to
three months in general, naked of body. Besides . • .
the remains of the state regiments consisting of 120
men for the war . . . .
Besides the above the State had raised at a great
expense a Corps of volunteers under Brig. General
Lawson to serve for six months--Said to consist of
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7 or 800 men I received them at Petersburg and found
only 57 cavalry and 203 infantry under arms . .
I am afraid that the arrangement of the Va line .on
the new est~blishment will be attended with many difficulties. 2~
After Steuben sent the 425 troops to General Greene,
his remaining force at Chesterfield Courthouse "by a return delivered me a few days. ago they do not· amount to 600
Men. 112 9

Most of these were sick and lacked clothing, blan-

kets, and other·essentials.

In order to determine how

many troops were dispersed throughout Virginia, Steuben
published the following notice in the Virginia Gazette of
De,cember 23, 1780:
By ·the Honorable Major General Baron de Steuben,·
commanding the troops in the state of Virginia. ·
The Honorable Congress of the United States having
directed that the officers of the state.of Virginia
on Continental establishment should assemble together
that their lives may be arranged under the new regulations of the 21st of November las.t: I do, therefore, hereby direct all Continental officers belonging
to the line of this state to repair to Chesterfield
Courthouse, on or before the 10th day of February now
ensuing; in order that their respective claims may be
considered, and finally decided upon. And should any
officer fail to attend at the time appointed, without
furnishing proper reasons for his absence, it will be
considered as a resignation. All such of the aforesaid officers who are in the vicinity of Chesterfield
Courthouse, are to repair thither as soon as possible,
to take charge of the trooRB who may be ready to march
to join the southern army.)
·
At the same time the Virginia General Assembly passed a
resolution authorizing regiments to be raised to meet the
new army establishment.

These troops were to total three

tpousand, but because of constant losses to sickness and
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desertion, Steuben felt this was still too small a number.
"I am informed that the Bill which passed the House of
Delegates • • • has limitted the number to 3000-- by. far
too small a number for the end proposed. •

. .1131: .

In fact, the whole system by which troops were
recruited had been unsatisfactory to Steuben.· Earlier in
December Steuben had written a series of letters to Governor Jefferson in Which he recommended changes which would
better meet the needs of the Southern Army.

In the first

letter on December 9, 1780 ,- Steuben stated that "The Frequent abuses that have happened • • • and an absolute
Necessity that those Men who are raised for the War in
Future should be fit for the Service and the Continent and
State no longer deceived, by having Old Men, Deserters,

~c

&c, imposed upon them; I have made the • • • [following
instructions • • • • 11 3 2

These instructions called for

recruits under fifty years of age, in good health, delivered by the county lieutenant, and all be accounted for
and under proper control.

A list of all bounties and

other payments should be kept so that any subsequent de=
sertion can be discovered.

On December 16 Steuben wrote

the second letter in which he addressed himself to another
area of recruiting--the quota system.

Steuben, following a

familiar system, referred to the European system calling
for the recruits to be selected in accordance with a class
system proportioned as nearly as possible according to

12

property.

This system required that:

each class be obliged to furnish a Man for the
War by a certain fixed period otherwise to be
subjected to a Draft. The recruit so furnished
to be considered as a representative of the class,
and in case of Death by sickness; or Desertion
to ~e re~laced by t~J Class in one month after
notice given • . . .
Steuben was convinced that these changes would solve
the recruiting problems.

Although the first suggest-

ion was implemen_ted and the second was not, the real
promoter of recruiting was invasion by the British.
The greatest success in Continental recruiting came
when the threat was most imminent.
Even when the troops were on hand, the other
of the problem appeared.
thing to equip them.

~ide

There was never enough of any-

Steuben spent much time on obtaining

arms, clothes, blankets, and food for the recruits, but it
never seemed to be enough.

Repeatedly Virginia was called

upon for all types of provisions, and repeatedly the supplies were given; however, the limited funds and credit
of Virginia could not provide it all.

Though Virginia's

efforts were in the best spirit of support, they constantly fell short of the goals.34
Another area with which he had become deeply involved almost from the first days after his arrival was
fortification of strategic areas susceptible to British
attack.

Since almost all movement was carried on by wa-

ter, particularly during the winter, the areas requiring
fortifications were those that commanded the main rivers
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and bays of the state.

H~re,

as it was with men and sup-

plies, Virginia seemed willing to do something but was
unable to provide complete and resolute action.

This was

illustrated by an attempt by Steuben to fortify a principal defensive site on the south side of the James River
about twenty miles south of City Point between Flowerdew
Hundred Creek and Ward's Creek, called Hood's.

This site

had been a flourishing mercantile center with a cooper' .s
shop, a smithy, ·and two large tobacco warehouses built on
a 100-acre tract owned by John Hood.

At this point there

was also a ferry between his place and Weynoke on the
north side of the river.

Besides this, the river narrowed

at this point, from which it could be defended with
tified emplacement.

a for-

A fort at this location would give

advance warning of any attempt to move up the river toward
Richmond, and would, if properly protected, slow down any
enemy's progress to allow the city to make defensive preparations . .35
Early in 1780 Governor Jefferson had charged
Colonel George Muter of the state garrison to construct a
battery at Hood's.

He obtained the assistance of the

owner, Walter Peter, and construction was begun.

By Sep-

tember 1780 it was apparent that a supply of bricks could
not be located, so the fort was not completed.

In Novem-

ber 1780 Steuben, with the assistance of Colonel John C.
Senf, prepared a report after visiting Hood's on what needed
to be done.

In transmitting the report to the House of

14

Delegates of the advantageous position of Hood's, he
declared that it was "considered as very capable of
opposing the passage of vessels."

The General Assem-

bly took no action other than to table Senf's report.
In spite of this leisurely effort, the fortress did
manage to receive three 18-pounder and one 24-pounder
cannons with a brass 8-inch howitzer.

Work on the para-

pets to provide .embrasures for the gun positions was
also completed al thot!gh the battery itself was not completed.

The identity of the workers or the source of

the cannon is not known.36
As a start, Steuben was making good progress ..

In ,

just over a month and a half, Steuben had called in the
scattered forces, made efforts to improve recruiting of
additional troops, given some promotion to the organization of his recruiting efforts through the use of depots,
sent troops to General Greene, and had applied some effort
to providing.security from attack by water, a most likely
prospect.

Those were the actions Washington and Greene

had expected of Steuben, and he was fulfilling their trust.
Another side of Steuben had yet to be tested--that of
field commander.

15

CHAPTER II
Arnold's Invasion
;

At 8 a.m. on Sunday, December 31, 11781:; .Governor
Jefferson received a letter from General Thomas Nelson,
enclosing a letter from Jacob Wray, which told of the
ominous developments in the Chesapeake Bay.

Passing

this information to Steuben, he said:
I have this moment received information that 27
sail of vessels, 18 of which were square rigged,
were yesterday morning just below Willoughby's
Point. No other circumstance being given to conjecture their force or destination • • • • 1
Steuben had been a trainer and organizer.

This emerge_ncy

would be his trial as field commander, and he would not
fare too well.

Immediately after receiving Jefferson's

letter, Baron von Steuben dispatched Colonel Senf, his
engineering expert, and Captain James Fairlie, an aide,
down the south side of the James River to gather intelligence as to tne ships'nationality, strength, and destination.

General Nelson was dispatched by Jefferson down

the north side of the James River to assist in this identification;

an~

if British, to call up militia capable

of opposing the force.

Steuben himself went some of the

way with Senf towards Hood's before returning to meet
with the Governor's Council on January 2, 178i1.

The fact

that the vessels and soldiers were British, under the command of newly commissioned Brigadier-General Benedict
Arnold, was co~firmed on January 2, 1781, when Colonel
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'

Nathanael Burwell~ County Lieutenant of James City Counti,
reported that the vessels were British and had advanced
as far as Wa:r.r.asqueak Bay.

The fleet, consisting of nine-

teen ships, two brigs, and ten sloops and schooners, had
departed New Jersey carrying a force which Washington's
intelligence had estimated to be twenty-five hundred men.
Enroute one ship became separated from the fleet during a
storm and-did not reach Virginia in time to join the first
invasion.

The actual raiding party in Warrasqueak Bay
2
That day Steuben met
was nearer sixteen hundred men.
with the governor and his council--David Jameson, William
Fleming, Andrew Lewis, George Webb, and Jacquelin Ambler-in Richmond, and a decision was made to immediately call
the following militia to assist the Continental troops:
. . . one-half of the militia of Henrico, Hanover, and
Goochland counties and one-fourth of the militia of
Fluvanna, Albemarle; and Amherst to rendez-vous at
Richmond; one-half of the militia of Chesterfield,
Powhatan, Cumberland, Dinwiddie, and Amelia, and onefourth af the militia of Buckingham, Bedford, Halifax, Charlotte, Prince Edward, Lunenberg, Mecklenberg, Sussex, Southampton, and Brunswick were ordered
to rendez-vous at Petersburg.3.
In addition, orders were issued to organize rifle companies of men called up from Shenandoah (216 men), Rockingham

(219~men),

Augusta (344 men), and Rockbridge (146

men) counties to move arms and other stores from Petersburg
toward Richmond and to bring the powder from the powder
mills to Westham.

Major Richard Claiborne was to have

boats collected at Westham to move supplies across the
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river if a threat developed there.

Completing their

deliberations, the legislature adjourned and carried the
orders for militia back to their respective counties.

4

Baron von Steuben, staying at Wilton, then located on the James River below Richmond, shuttled back
and forth between Richmond and Chesterfield Courthouse.
He wrote a letter to George Muter, Commissioner of War
for Virginia, dated January 1, 1781, informing him that
"the present alarm has occasioned my ordering four hundred of the [Continental] troops at Chesterfield to hold
themselves in readiness for marching. 115

However, on

January 2, 1781, Steuben found that only one hundred· fifty
of the Continental troops at Chesterfield Courthouse were
physically able to fight.

These were formed into a batta-

lion and sent to Petersburg to protect supplies stored
there until Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Carrington could
get there and remove them.

6

As Steuben moved about be-

tween Richmond, Chesterfield Courthouse, and Manchester,
he was most interested in where the enemy was bound.
Governor Jefferson had stated that since confirmation of
the first sighting of the enemy had not been received in
the five hours or so, as had been expected, he had come to
the opinion that "the first intelligence should be totally
disbelieved."7

William Tatum, reporting to Steuben.the

evening of January 2, found everything in total confusion.
Even after confirmation of the identity of the invading
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force on January 2, 1781, the destination was still unknown.

It might still have been Williamsburg, Jamestown,

Petersburg, Richmond, or maybe even beyond to Charlottesville, where British soldiers constituting the remnant
of General John Burgoyne's Convention Army still resided.
Accordingly, Jefferson wrote a letter to Francis Taylor
in Charlottesville to move the British to "Fort Frederic,"
in Maryland.8
On the morning of January J, General Arnold's
fleet was off Williamsburg and Jamestown.

Though he put

a party ashore, they reembarked almost immediately.

This

was possibly because of the militia General Nelson and
Colonel James Innes had collected and brought to Williamsburg.

General Nelson had informed a courier sent from

Arnold that he intended to defend the town.

As the

fleet moved upriver, uncertainty over the probable
destination of the fleet narrowed.

Arnold was bound to

be headed for Petersburg, Richmond, or Westham.

Once

past Williamsburg, the next point from which the fleet
could be opposed would be Hood's.

Major James Cooke of

the militia and Captain John Allen of the State Artillery
Regiment had managed to assemble about seventy-five men
there.

Steuben continued to have great faith in the

ability of Hood's to repel an enemy, so he hoped that
these men could slow down or deter the advance.

By even-

ing word was passed that the fleet had passed Brandon

19

Plantation eight miles below Hood's and the first British
schooner advanced under the guns and was fired upon by the
18-pounder.

By 10 p.m. the remaining ships anchored below

Hood's, and twenty small boats carrying one hundred thirty
tro9ps were dispatched to Ward's Creek to subdue the American garrison.

Afraid of being overrun, the defenders

pulled back; but before departing, they fired two more
rounds of warning toward the ships.
the British
doned.

forces~

By 12 midnight, when

arrived, they found the battery aban-

The troops spiked the cannon, burned the gun car-

riages, and carried off the howitzer.

With no further

action possible at that late hour, the Brrtish fleet qrew
up near the fortifications and anchored for the night.9
On January 4, 1781, the fleet made
tions known.

its· inten-

Leaving Hood's, the fleet proceeded to West-

over and began disembarking troops on the north side of
the James River.

They were headed for Richmond.lo

Al-

though Arnold expressed doubts at first as to whether to
march in the face of a militia surely accumulating at
Richmond, Lieutenant-Colonels Thomas Dundas and John Simcoe persuaded him that the magazines at Richmond were
worth it.

The British. troops accordingly left Westover 11

and advanced as far as Four-Mile Creek, where they encamped for the night. 12
In response to the arrival of General Arnold this
far up the James River, Governor Jefferson changed the
20

previous order of January 2 in which the· county lieutenants were instructed to send only a portion of the
militia to an order in which they were instructed to
send all the militia.
The rapid Approach of the enemy renders it
necessary that for instant Opposition you embody the whole able to bear arms. Should they
not be armed, there are Waggons loaded with arms
at Chesterfield Courthouse. • • • I must desire
that you without a moment's delay send every
man in your County able to bear Arms to rendezvous at Westham.15
On January

4, 1781, Jefferson told Steuben that:

Majr. Dick calls on me for an order for the
militia of this place to march.
I beg you
will be so good as to consider the militia
of every place as under your command from
the moment of their being embodied, and to
direct tUeir motions and stations as you
please.l
Steuben was then in charge of all the troops.

Mean-

while, even as this new responsibility was being passed
to him by Jefferson, Steuben spent the day around
Richmond collecting any remaining militia.

Although

a sizable force was gathering in Manchester, there
were, to his surprise, only about one hundred in Richmond.15

These he organized under Major Alexander Dick

of the state militia and sent them down the James
with instructions to oppose the enemy at every possible opportunity.

In

th~

confusion of the moment,

Major Dick, who was completely unfamiliar with the terrain
and who had also found that he was in receipt of poor
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intelligence about Arnold's whereabouts, misunderstood
and stumbled around, at first marching east toward the
Chickahominy River, then back toward Richmond.

This

movement kept the Americans from opposing the British
approach.16

In advance of the British

troops, Steuben

sent the remaining Continental stores and provisions out
of Richmond toward Westham, then across the river to be
dispersed in the countryside.

The state provisions, which

were located in Richmond, were also moved out of town to
the west.

These, however, were not under the direct

control of Steuben, but of the Commissioner of the Virginia War Office, Colonel George Muter.17colonel Davies
was directed to move all the stores out of Chesterfield
Courthouse, relocate the hospital, have the tailor and
tanner move from Warwick to join the smith and staff at
Chesterfield Courthouse, and order the one hundred fifty·
Continentals sent to Petersburg on January 2 to march
back up and take position across the river from Westham.
In addition, he was to bring the remaining Continentals-sick, clothed, armed or not--to Westham.

Having directed

this movement from the headquarters at Chesterfield Courthouse, Steuben retired during the evening of January 4
to Manchester to collect the militia assembled there and
oppose any effort the British might have made to cross
the Jarnes.18
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While Steuben waited on the south side, the
British approached Richmond along the north.

Departing

their camp on Four-Mile Creek the morning of January 5,
the British troops rebuilt a bridge across the creek
that the American troops had earlier destroyed.

Prior

to reaching Richmond at about 1 p.m. on January

5, the

British encountered American troops two times.

The

first was an encounter with the party which had burned
the bridge; the second was a patrol about seven miles
southeast of Richmond.

When the British finally reached

Richmond, numbers of militia, some armed but many others
not armed, appeared before the British at Church Hill.
This force included Major Dick, his militia, and spectators.

When an assault was attempted on the hill by

Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe, the troops fled into the surrounding woods.

Following this assault, the British

moved on to Shockoe Hill and dispersed the Americans
there. 1 9
Throughout the time Arnold was on the north side
of the river, Steuben had remained on the south side.
His disposition of troops at Manchester was to protect
his lines of supply and retreat, and he ignored the fact
that all the political and military targets a reluctant
general could want were readily available north of the
river.

(Arnold did not march on Richmond until persuaded

2J

by his officers).

This reluctance by Steuben to directly

oppose the British must be attributed to a lack of knowledge of how effective his small number of troops would
be in combat and insufficient information about his opposition.

Perhaps if he had remained in Richmond and opposed

Arnold directly, he would have been soundly defeated.
it was, a greater damage was done in the minds of

As

Virgin~

ians concerning the ability of his military force to defend
the state.

This in turn affected the willingness of the

people to support the military effort.
Having returned from pursuing the retreating soldiers in Richmond, Simcoe was told to take the Queen's
Rangers, together with the flank companies of the 80th,
and mar.ch on and destroy the foundry, laboratory, and
magazine at Westham. 20
Prior to the arrival of Simcoe at Westham and
while Steuben was at Manchester, Governor Jefferson went
to the foundry on the evening of January

4 to observe

for himself how Steuben's directions to Major Claiborne
were being carried out.
Irish and others.

There he met Captain Nathaniel

Together they spent most of the night

moving the powder, arms, and munitions out of the foundry
and across the river in the boats Major Claiborne had
provided.

The next morning, after moving his family·from

Tuckahoe across the river to Fine Creek, Jefferson returned, and "finding the arms &c. in a heap near the shore,
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and exposed to be destroyed by cannons from the North
bank, he had them removed behind a point of land near
by.1121
Steuben left Manchester after seeing that Arnold
was not seriously considering the crossing of the James.
His destination was Colonel William Fleming's· house in
Powhatan County (near Midlothian).
of Friday, January
son.

Here on the evening

5, 1781, he met with Governor Jeffer-

While there, the two were presented a proposal

from General Arnold carried by several businessmen from
Richmond.

The proposal stated that if Richmond were

surrendered without resistance, the city would then be
spared and only the tobacco taken.

Neither Jefferson nor

Steuben would agree. 22
At about this time, Simcoe arrived at Westham and
destroyed everything he found.

He broke the trunnions off

the cannon and broke up a large quantity of small arms
and military stores.· He set fire to the boring mill, the
magazine, the ordnance repair shop (laboratory), John
Ballandine's house, and one or two warehouses.

Some of

the state documents which had been brought to Westham also
were destroyed.

The foundry itself had only its roof

burned off; its chimney remained intact. 2 3

The magazine

had originally been set to be blown up but:
Upon consultation with the artillery officer,- it
was thought better to destroy the magazine than to
blow it up, this fatiguing business was effected
by carrying the powder down the cliffs, and pouring
it into the water; the wtrehouses and mills were
then set on fire • • • • 2
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Finally, after raising five cannon dumped into the
river by departing American troops and destroying them,
Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe and his troops returned to
Richmond, arriving late the night of January

5.

There

the men, fatigued with the march, fell asleep or got into
private homes and obtained rum.

Though large scale

plundering was strictly forbidden by the British, damage
and looting by "straggling parties" was significant and
costly.

The tobacco requested as ransom for the city

the day before was untouched.

Even so, as the British

prepared to leave Richmond, fire was set to several publie buildings, the ropewalk, warehouses, and workshops.
These fires also destroyed several houses and one of the
town's two printing presses.

While much of the blame is

given to the British, Americans, both white and black,
were also responsible for fires and looting in the town. 2 5
In the end, buildings and property in all parts of Richmond were severly damaged or burned.

Steuben, mean-

while, prepared to move east from Midlothian through
January 6 was the day
he stopped waiting and began the chase. 26

Manchester and south to Warwick.

Just after noon on January 6, exactly twentyfour hours after coming to Richmond, retracing his steps
toward Four-Mile Creek and Westover, Arnold left behind
a town covered by a great" cloud of smoke, with provisions
and liquor strewn about the streets.
began to rain hard in Richmond. 2 7
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Toward evening it

As Arnold and Simcoe retraced their steps toward
Westover, the American troops moved forward to keep an
eye on them.

General Nelson, who had been protecting

Williamsburg, kept his troops north of the James River,
but moved them steadily up to Charles City Courthouse
while Steuben, still on the south side of the river, at
first moved south to Warwick on January 6 to protect
the grain stored there, and then to Osborne's on January

7.

As they moved, both Steuben and Nelson received militia
responding to the call of January 2 and

4.

Since Steuben

had ordered the dispersal of arms at Petersburg, Richmond,
and Westham to prevent their capture, no arms were on hand
to give the new arrivals.

When he left Midlothian, Steu-

ben had about one hundred fifty armed Continentals, plus
two hundred militia which he had picked up at Manchester
on January

5.

By the night of the 8th, when Steuben had

reached Petersburg and joined the militia under Colonel
Gibson, his force numbered about eight hundred.

Suffi-

cient numbers of these men were unarmed to prompt Steuben
to write to Governor Jefferson on January 6 to send one
. ~8
thousand stand of arms.- . Unfortunately, most of the
good arms saved from Westham which could be found had been
given to the Hanover militia.

The rest were scattered in

church eaves, barns, or otherwise hidden away.

Try.as

they would, neither Colonel Davies, George Muter, nor
Governor Jefferson could obtain the arms required.
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On

January

7

Steuben paused in his movements south of the

James long enough to write from Osborne's that with
more militia arriving all the time, the shortage of
arms was becoming critical.

On the 8th Governor Jeffer-

son managed to find some cartridges to send to Steuben
and to General Nelson, but the arms were still inaccessible. 29
General-Nelson, watching General Arnold, wrote
to Governor Jefferson that on Saturday, January

7, he

had intended to attack the British rear, but ''· • . the
Gates of Heaven were opened, and such a Flood of Rain
poured down as rendered my Plan abortive by almost drowning the Troops . . . . n30

Instead, on January 8 a patrol

of the Queen's Rangers, which had set out for Long Bridge,
captured several riders who told of an assembly of some
of General Nelson's militia at Charles City Courthouse.
Turning in that direction, Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe
and a small
evening.

detacl~ment

reached the

a~ea

in the early

In the action which followed, the militia was

dispersed.31. Steuben, still moving along the south side
of the James, was camped in Petersburg without means to
cross the James River.
Though it has not been conclusively shown that
Steuben's real concern had been the defense of Chesterfield County from the Courthouse to Petersburg, it probably was on his mind.

On January 9 Steuben concluded that

Arnold's inactivity at Westover was not a prelude to
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attack on Petersburg.

He therefore moved the militia

further south to Prince George Courthouse.

Receiving

word early on the morning of January 10 that the British were reboarding their ships, Steuben immediately
returned to Coggins Point, located across the river from
Westover, and personally observed the loading.
turned again to the battery at Hood's.

Steuben

He sent Colonel

George Rogers Clark with three hundred infantry and
thirty horse cavalry to the abandoned fortress to oppose
the fleet when they went downstream.

Though the cannon

had been rendered unusable, the British would still stop
to make sure.

4

At 12 noon the fleet got underway and· by

p.m. had reached Flowerdew Hundred, where at dark a

force of approximately five hundred troops were put
ashore in eighteen boats to examine the battery. 32
Gen. Arnold had scarcely landed, and Col. Dundas,
with the 80th regiment, was not yet on shore,
when a patrole of the enemy fell into the ambuscade of ·the Yagers, and exchanged shot with them:
the night was very dark. Gen. Arnold directed Lt.
Col. Simcoe immediately to march toward's Eland's,
with Col. Robinson's regiment and his own infantry; but the cavalry did not land. The detachment
had not proceeded above two miles, when Robinson's
co~ps in front received a heavy fire.
There was
no room for disposition, for the road ran through
a wood which was remarkably thick, at the forks
of which, as the clearest ground, the enemy had
placed themselve~. Upon the firing, the troops
were immediately ordered to charge; they rushed
forward and the enemy fled:
near twenty of Col.
Robinson's regiment were killed and wounded . • . .
. . . The troops returned to Hood's battery, which
having totally dismantled, they carried off the
heavy artillery and quitted it; the next day reembarking and falling down the river.33
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That same night, January 10, Steuben had marched
with his militia to Eland's Mill, about seven miles from
Hood's.

The following day, Thursday, January 11, he

arrived at Hood's, but the British had left.

He ordered

three hundred infantry and two troops of horse cavalry
to continue on to Cabin Point and, for the first time,
sent 560 militia across the river to reinforce General
Nelson at Williamsburg.

General Arnold continued down

the river; making no further attempt to land until reaching Hardy's Ferry twenty-two miles below Cabin Point.
There the British began their march toward Smithfield,
where they arrived without incident on January

15.

From

January 16 to 21 Steuben remained at Cabin Point, while
on January 19 General Arnold reached Portsmouth, where
he disembarked, established his camp, and sent his vessels on down to Hampton Roads.

Steuben, meanwhile, left

Cabin Point ?n January 21 and, following the path of the
British troops, arrived in Smithfield on January 22.34
On his arrival Steuben stationed the American troops
with the express purpose of:
. • . preventing the Enemies parties from making
incursions into the Country on either Side of the
James River or should they undertake to come out
with their whole force, to render any enterprize
of theirs difficult, always having in view the keeping open the communications across James River.35
To do this, Steuben deployed troops on both sides of
the James River to observe and contain General Arnold.
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General Muhlenberg was placed in command of all forces
south of the James, and General Lawson commanded all
forces north of the river.

General Nelson backed them

up with one thousand militia located in Williamsburg.
Steuben had not done well in the first effort
as a field commander.

Throughout the campaign he had

been on the wrong side of the river and unable to· oppose
the British.

Because of this, he was only able to pre-

vent a raid on Chesterfield Courthouse and Petersburg.
At the same time he allowed the British free access to
Richmond, the seat of Virginia government, and the foundry
and arsenal at Westham.

He also lost control of arms and

supplies needed for offensive action against the British
after the attack.

Only the desire of General Arnold not

to overextend himself and his overriding intention to
return to Portsmouth before he could be captured saved
Virginia from worse depredations.

A military commander

cannot long afford these mistakes and avoid defeat.
people of Virginia were also taking notes.

The

They would

want to know why such an intrusion could have been made
over a nineteen-day period with so little resistance.
Both Steuben and Jefferson would be called upon to
justify their actions.3 6

Jl

C.HAPTER III
Logistics and Manpower Problems
Baron von Steuben survived his first military
action in Virginia.

It formed a part of a learning pro-

cess which had begun at Chesterfield Courthouse while
trying to bring organization to the Continental Quartermaster Department and promoting cooperation between the
Continental troops and the Virginia militia.

In November

1780, when Steuben began his organizational effort, all
manner of activities were centered in Richmond.

When the

government had moved from Williamsburg, the city had become

th~

staff headquarters in Virginia with all the con-

fusion such a move meant.

Here, in one area, was the state

government, the laboratory, offices of all sorts, and even
the location of one of the four Continental quartermaster
depots. 1
Steuqen, however, soon took a step wh_ich decreased
somewhat such centralization.

He separated a portion of

the Continental and state government and quartermaster
organizations by moving some activities to a county courthouse.

These courthouses were points where county govern-

ment, court, and the militia assembled and where other
affairs of mutual interest to all residents of the county
were transacted.

About ten miles south of Richmond was

one such location known as Chesterfield County Courthouse.
Once before, this location had attracted the attention of
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Governor Jefferson and Steuben's predecessor, General
Peter Muhlenberg, who felt its location made it ideal
for quartering recruits.

Steuben likewise felt this

way and that in addition to a troop rendezvous, it
would also be an excellent choice for a Continental depot
because it was near enough to the capital at Richmond
for ease of communication and a place from which the
business of the quartermaster department could be conducted.

It was also far enough away to be reasonably

safe if the capital should come under attack.

The

barracks at Chesterfield County Courthouse which were
quartering the new recruits could be refurbished and from
here Steuben could establish a program of drill and military instruction.

Other buildings including the jail

located there could be used for manufacturing and storage
of supplies, with land available for more barracks if
necessary. 2

Chesterfield County Courthouse now joined

the other three depots, Alexandria, Fredericksburg, and
Petersburg in stocking items for the military.

These

movements were directly in line with Steuben's responsibility to preserve Virginia as a source for men and
materiel and to keep them moving southward.

As Greene

specified in his letter of December 8, 1780:
• . • inform the state that the troops must be properly found with everything to fit them for servjce,
or that they will not be received. Use every agrument you can to convince the Assembly of th~ necessity of clothing their troops. If they mean they
shall render any service (to the army) or do not
wish to fall a sacrifice to death, desertion and
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disease, I beg them to give their men good cover-~
ing, for without it this will be their portion.j :
Steuben also wrote the same day to Washington
that he was well aware that the state of internal affairs
would require improvement before he could meet his responsibilities to General Greene.
. The derangement of the finances is more sensibly felt here than in any other part of the continent.
All the wheels of the administration are stopped;
the late invasion of the enemy has completed the
confusion. (General Leslie in October 1780) The
few articles which were in the Continental as well
as State magazines were distributed, without any
orders, to the several corps of Volunteers, Militia,
etc., and although the strictest orders have been
given to collect the whole, I fear a considerable
number will be lost.
The Quarter-master's Department and indeed almos~
all the departments here have no head. The Exec~
utive part of the administration is carried on only
by expedients, while the Legislature cannot agree
on any system whatsoever. They are now debating
on the state of finances, and the new arrangement of
the army has not yet been taken into consideration.
Nothing will be more difficult than to arrange the
line of office~s of this state according to the new
Establishment •

.

One of Steuben's first steps was to appoint Colonel William Davies to oversee the assembling and equipping of troops to be sent to General Greene.

Steuben

also charged him with the renovation of the barracks,
conversion of the courthouse into a hospital and transformation of the two jails--one for debtors and the
other for criminals--into magazines for the storage of
food and supplies.

Additionally, Davies would be re-

sponsible for constructing new barracks for the troops
and a tailor's shop from wood in the nearby forests.5
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As construction and renovation progressed, Davies began
to move the supplies at Richmond to Chesterfield Courthouse.

It became the largest and most important recruit-

ing and supply depot in Virginia and the key to an overall plan to improve the organization of the quartermaster
departments.
It would take more than this realignment to solve
the logistics problems facing Steuben.

They were deep

and widespread. ·To properly assess the magnitude of these
problems and Steuben's handling of them, each of the major
categories of supply, transportation, and manpower must
be considered--so too must Steuben's relationship with
the Virginia government.
During the early part of the war, militia units in
Virginia had secured supplies directly from merchants who
had in turn billed the government for payment.

Before

long, fraudulent or inflated claims were being submitted.
This had

cau~ed

disputes over reimbursements and a clamor

for tighter control of funds.6

In order to correct the

abuses, changes in both the Continental and state quartermaster departments were taking place.
in Virginia when Steuben arrived.

Such was the case

To improve the relia-

bility of the departments, people were appointed who could
work with the Continental officials in Philadelphia and
the Virginia state officials to solve the problems interfering with supply support for the Southern Army..

These

people had to be not only resourceful and innovative but
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9ften stubborn when they found themselves having to commandeer and impress supplies from the local populace.
Steuben appointed Major Richard Claiborne to be
Continental Deputy Quartermaster General for Virginia.
In addition to the Continental position, Claiborne was
also Virginia Quartermaster General until March 1781.
Finding both jobs entirely too difficult to perform,
Claiborne finally resigned the state post and was succeeded by Captairi Henry Young.7

Other Continental

quartermaster personnel with whom Steuben, Claiborne,
and Davies would work were John Peyton, Clothier General
Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Carrington, Deputy QMG; Captain
Charles Russell, Assistant Deputy QMG; John Lightfoot,
Assistant Commissary of Hides; Captain Berryman Green,
Continental Deputy Quartermaster; and William Aylett,
Commissary of Supplies. 8 On the whole, the Continental
organization was capable and dedicated, but Steuben soon
found that eyen with the best of organizations, some
problems were insurmountable.
In the early war years of 1776-1777, Virginia had
been a state with a very prosperous economy.

This pros-

perity had enabled the state to be generous in providing
supplies to the war effort.

The state raised sufficiently

large crops of foodstuffs, not only to feed the population, including the army, but also to offer them for export.9

Virginia also had one of the largest producing

lead mines in the colonies, located in the western part

J6

pf the state. 10

Although almost all arms were important,

most Virginians possessed a weapon to use for hunting and
protection as well as to comply with a law in Virginia
requiring every man to own a firearm while serving as a
member of the militia.

Clothing, too, was often imported,

but since the militiaman wore ordinary clothes rather than
a special uniform, that which was available or locally
manufactured satisfied the day-to-day needs of the militia.
During 1777 when powder was plentiful, large quantities
had been purchased and stored in Henrico, Dinwiddie, and
Chesterfield Counties. 11 Virginia had the materiel
to support an army.
In the latter years of the war, the picture
changed.

Shortages of many items began to appear and so

did the problems in supply.

The main problem areas in

supply were in arms and ammunition, clothing and leather
accoutrements, food, and funding responsibility.
Steuben found that so many weapons had become unserviceable or lost by 1781 that the lack of weapons was affecting the army's ability to conduct warfare.

Except for the
.

few weapons made at Hunter's Arms Works in Fredericksburg,
and the Kentucky and Pennsylvania rifles which were
brought in from ·the Frontier, most of the arms in Virginia were French; including the muskets which were.the
main weapon of the infantry. 12 As these weapons_ became
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damaged, they ~ere
at first taken to Westham. 1 3
,

After

its destruction, provisions were made to send the damaged arms wherever workmen skilled at repairing arms
could be found and hired to make the required repairs.
This was not always easy to do for some artisans found
ways to avoid this type of work.

One such instance

occurred early in January when William Davies tried unsuccessfully to obtain the services of a Mr. Cunningham to
help repair arms damaged when Arnold moved up the James
River to Richmond.

Not every man placed patriotism first. 1 ~

Steuben brought the problem up on April 21 when
he wrote:
The great distress we are in for Arms has determined
me to deliver out all those we have here (Chesterfield Courthouse) that were destined for the Recruits,
excep 150 which I have delivered to the recruits that
are here. I have at the same time taken the arms out
of the hands of the Artificiers, in order that they
may be delivered to the Militia. Notwithstanding our
Distress I find that the 1,000 arms which have been
distributed to the troops under Genl. Muhlenberg are
not in a condition to be used.
I have 6rdered Capt. Prior to establish ~ Manufactory
for the reparation of Arms at Powhatan Co. Hq. I
have written to Genl. Muhlenberg to send the Armorers
from Broad water to that place that they may be immediately set to work, but as more hands will be necessary for the reparation of so great a number of Arms
in so short a time, I request your Excellency to furnish as many armorers as possible . • • • lB
Though arms never would be in good supply and
there would always be newly arrived recruits who were
without any kind of weapon, Steuben's efforts at least
provided some serviceable arms for the militia in the field.
Powder and lead were also a problem.

J8

Lead, which

was from the Virginia mines had been available in large
quantities but since then, quantities of the metal had
been squandered, sold, given away or used up until now
lead supplies were almost depleated. 1 6 Powder too had
once been ample to meet Virginia's requirements.

Now,

however, Virginia powder requirements, rested on the
meager imports from the West Indes, stocks brought in
from elsewhere, and that which was produced in laboratories.

One such laboratory had originally been estab-

lished in Richmond.

Colonel Timothy Pickering, a member

of the Continental Board of War and active in quartermaster affairs, had noted that a Continental laboratory
in Virginia would significantly aid

support to the

~rmy

in the South so in conjunction with Lieutenant-Colonal
Edward Carrington, Pickering explored the possibilities
of moving the laboratory to Westham and expanding it to
handle Continental needs.

Becoming one of the largest

and most complete facilities in America, this laboratory
not only repaired arms and made cartridges but also cast
cannon in its foundry. 1 1 It served in this capacity until
its destruction in January 1781, after which it never
again was able to achieve its former capability. 18 Other
items in extremely short supply were clothing and leather
accoutrements.

When the Virginia government decided to

establish factories and hire artisans to make footwear
and overalls to meet the shortage, two locations; Petersburg and Albemarle Barracks, were designated as centers
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for clothing manufacture. 19

However, to satisfy require~

ments for clothing, blankets, and accoutrements the items
had to be imported from outside the state or abroad, and
these sources fluctuated in reliability as
the British increased or decreased.
never seem to get enough of anything.

press~re

by

The troops could
William Davies re-

ported on the unresponsiveness of the supply: system to
Jefferson on January 25, 1781:
I found . ~ • that all the troops • • • had by order
of.Baron Steuben come back to this station, from
their utter inability to keep the field, from a want
of almost every species of cloathing. Many men have
not a remnant of cloathing larger than a good napkin
to cover their nakedness, and a number of these are
dependent upon others for a part of· a blanket to shelter them at night from the cold . . • • • Unless some
method can be adopted for supplying the men, th~y
had much better be dismissed altogether; they are
not able to do any thing in the field, and near 60
of them too naked to do any thing in quarters, and
every idea of training them for actual service has
long since been laid aside.
On those items which were provided_, a distinct lack of
coordination was evident when they were issued to the
soldiers.
• • • Another great misfortune is the manner of
issuing the cloathing. A good pair of stockings is
given to a naked soldier today; he has no shoes and
wears them out by the next week, and in a fortnight
afterwards when his stockings are gone, he gets his
shoes; Or perhaps he gets his breeches, but no lining to them; a new coat or a fashionable hat, but
has no shirt, or if he has, he is without breeches.
By this means, the country runs into d~Bt, and the
soldier is always uncomfortable • • • •
Food would seldom be a problem in Virginia.· As
the British invasions followed one another, however,
Steuben would be required to replace rations captured by
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the enemy.

For example, following the Battle of P:etersburg,

large quantities of flour were destroyed on board vessels at
Osborne's, and quantities of foodstuffs were destroyed at
Warwick. 21 In addition, Steuben would have difficulties
with forage for horses and would even levy fines against
individuals when forage was available but not given.
Compounding the shortages of supplies was a shortage of money as well.

While Continental army letters of

credit were accepted earlier in the war with minimal
resistance, the value of Continental currency had become
so depreciated by 1780 that individuals receiving quartermaster certificates in payment for supplies or services
complained bitterly.

The certificates were of such little

value that county officials would not even accept them in
payment for taxes. 22 No efforts by Steuben could solve
this problem.

He was only able to pressure the govern-

ment to still provide money so supplies could be bought.
Als~

facing Steuben and master departments were

problems of transportation--especially water transportation.

Supplies and equipment in the American colonies

had always moved by one of three means--carried by the
colonist, loaded onto pack animals or wagons, or in the
boats and ships which sailed the waters of America.
Though boats were the best means by which materiel,
including military supplies, could be moved to and ·
within America, Steuben and his staff in Virginia would
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.have difficulty moving supplies to the Southern Army
because all the rivers flowed in the wrong direction.
Supplies needed to move south from New England,

Mary~

land, and Pennsylvania through Virginia to General Greene
in the South.

.

Using the rivers which flowed northwest to

southwest, the supplies traveled many miles and sometimes
days out of the way.

There was also a distinct shortage

of deep draft vessels capable of carrying a significant
quantity of goods.

Before the war most of these ships

were British and were lost to the colonists when hostilities broke out.

Even if there had been large numbers of

these vessels, the British Navy would have quickly captured them since there was no significant American Navy
to protect them.
The primitive roads in Virginia were not much
better for they were little more than footpaths, dusty
in summer and wet and muddy in winter.

In the winter, in

fact, most military activity came to a halt and the troops
established camps in which to rest until_ good weather once
more allowed operations to begin again.
for this.

There were reasons

The mud and snow would become so deep that move-

ment of supplies would be paralyzed for days or weeks at a
time.

The type of transportation would also create prob-

lems since supplies were only given minimal protection
from the weather, large quantities of supplies coul4 be
destroyed simply moving the items from one place _to
another.

Yet, for all these difficulties, the horse or

9x and wagon became the principal vehicle for moving
military supplies in Virginia.

The owners of these

wagons, who in other ways supported the war effort,
would do almost anything to prevent their horse or oxen
and wagon from being impressed.

This is understandable

when it is realized that their wagon was the only way
they had for moving items to market.23
On April 4, 1781, Richard Claiborne wrote Jefferson concerning his frustration over the lack of wagons:
The great demands which are made upon me for things
to be furnished from this department, both for the
Southern Army and the Troops within this State,
alarm me more and more, as I have Not the means to
answer any purpose whatsoever. I am called upon
by the Commissary General of Purchases, and the
Commissary General of Military Stores for Wagons
and horses daily, to transport their Stores and·
have it not in my power to procure any. The preparations which the Baron directed me to make for
the Cavalry and Infantry to be equipped in this
State cannot be done, as I have not money to purchase, and I cannot get credit for an Article •
• • • In short Sir, I plainly foresee, that unless
I have great aid from some near resource, the operations ~f the whole department will stop in a few
days. 2 ·
On April 9 he.again complained to Jefferson:
• • • I have failed in all my endeavours towards
obtaining the wagons . . • • having no Public Waggons
in the State but what are already appropriated, and
that very necessarily; I ask Government for aid, or
I m.ust decline the attempt, as I have no ~ossible
prospect for accomplishing the business. 2 ~
These shortages were especially frustrating to
Steuben who had asked Davies and Claiborne to move materiel for use by the army.

Delays could be expected when-

ever wagons could not be found or when they had to be
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moved long distances such as from Fredericksburg to
Richmond or from Williamsburg to Point of Fork.

Davies

set out to solve the problem by repairing and manufacturing wagons at Dinwiddie Courthouse.

Although some wagons

were completed there, this created no solution partly
because the artisans, especially reputable blacksmiths,
were expensive and hard to find.

More progress was made

by sending a highly regarded person out to gather what
his talents and reputation would allow. 2 6
Still another problem was manpower.

In 1775, Vir-

ginia had boasted well over fifty thousand white males of
military age (sixteen to fifty years) under a universal
militia obligation.

During the intervening years, the

warfare had made many demands on this pool of manpower.
A number of Virginia soldiers were committed to guarding
the British prisoners of war or ''Convention Army" from
the surrender at Saratoga, and another force had been
dispatched to the western frontier.

1780, when the

Additionally, in May

British captured Charleston, almost the

entire active Virginia Continental line was taken prisoner.
Two weeks later, Banastre Tarleton's cavalry defeated Colonel Abraham Buford's recruits, who had been sent to
reinforce the Virginia Continental regiments.

On August

16, the defeat of General Gates cost Virginia another two
hundred state regulars when virtually the whole army was
sent scurrying from the field with heavy losses.

Of those

troops remaining after the battle, most were reluctant to
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rejoin any military force.27
If Steuben was to make use of the available manpower in supporting Greene, a number of problems basic to
militia organization had to be resolved.

Financial respon-

sibility for troops under Continental control, the militia
system with its county lieutenant and court-martial, the
philosophy regarding exemptions for artisans·and others
critical to the war effort, and the provision of direct
reinforcements to the Southern Army when it was outside
Virginia--these were all problems in this category.
When Jefferson placed all military forces, including the militia, under Steuben's command at the time of
General Arnold's invasion of Virginia in January 1780,
Steuben became deeply involved in the question of financial responsibility for the militia during periods of
crisis.

Regulations at the time stated that under these

conditions, state forces became the responsibility of the
Continental 9ongress in matters of pay and support.

Steu-

ben, however, made it very clear that the Continental
forces assumed responsibility only when the militia· actually "took the field, armed and formed into a fighting
force. 1128
Less successful were his encounters with the
Virginian militia system.

In Virginia, the county lieu-

tenant acted as liaison between the governor and the
county on administrative matters relating to the militia
and the county court-martial
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directed the militia,

approved promotions, and controlled the draft.

Each was

an important element of the organization, without whom
militia would.not be raised.

Unfortunately, the county

court-martial was not responsible to the county lieutenant, however it alone decided whether the militia would
report often; therefore, the wishes of the Governor could
be lost if a conflict existed between the two elements.
The power of the court-martial was not inconsequential
because a large

~ounty

had as many as twenty to twenty-

five companies and each company had from thirty-two to
sixty-eight men.

Steuben's arrival in Virginia had caused

friction in this area from the beginning.

Steuben had

intended to recruit volunteers and take all who came "his
way, equip them from state stores, and send them south.
This philosophy ran directly opposed to the state militia
system where officers gained rank by the number of men
they brought with them.

To compound the situation, these

officers and members of the court-marial were usually the
most influential people in a county.

There was, there-

fore, a tendency to favor the local system instead 9f the
needs of a Continental officer who would take his share
and leave.

However, Steuben found himself in the unique

position of maintaining both systems when he became Commander of all Virginia troops following Arnold's invasion.
Steuben continued his efforts, however, and considering
the significance of the problem, was able to obtain Continental recruits though not in the numbers desired.
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As

the war intensified in Virginia there was also a greater
difficulty in obtaining all troops. 2 9
Steuben was also confronted with those who needed
exemptions from military service.

Many of these requests

were from the government, personnel of the quartermaster
departments, and the artisans and artificiers who were
employed by the quartermaster department.

While anyone

could apply for exemption, few were approved.

Though pro-

viding fair treatment for everyone, it soon created shortages of some skills needed in a community to provide continued support.

On one occasion all the tailors at the

Petersburg clothing manufactory were drafted by the county
court-martial.

An appeal was made to Steuben but when he

did not intercede to try for an exemption from the governor, the whole facility had to be closed down.30

As

the war progressed, these shortages became recognized and
such jobs as wagon master and armorer were granted exemptions.

For example, John Lightfoot, Assistant Commissary

for Hides, became the subject of a request for exemption
which was approved because without him there would have
been a shortage of leather for saddles and other cavalry
equipment.3 1

The reason for this low approval rate was

the widespread belief held by Steuben and the civil authorities that the draft was equitable, honestly run, and a
man's chances of receiving the call were not that great.
Early in the war only Continental forces.were
expected to fight outside their home state.
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If an

~xpeditionary

force had to be raised, the troops volun-

teering to go were enlisted or transferred to the Continental forces for a specified period, usually eighteen
months.

When volunteers were not available, a draft was

implemented with each county being given a quota to fill.
The remainder of the militia would be used to defend the
local population within the county.

Sometimes, however,

when this process would be too slow to meet emergencies,
the state militia from the counties closest to the threat
would be employed directly.

Virginia responded in this

way when Greene was being pursued by Cornwallis to the
Dan River.

Once this militia was called up the county

court martial might then agree for the militia to remain
on duty with the Continental troops without being transferred.

Such was the case from March 1 to March 15, 1781

when more than twelve hundred militia, including two brigades of eastern Virginia militia under Generals Edward
Stevens and Robert Lawson and another two from western
Virginia under Colonels-Charles Lynch and William Campbell,
were in Greene's army.

These militia troops were

~f

great

assistance to General Greene but since they had a shorter
term of enlistment they could only be counted on for two
to three months.3 2
As the overall commander of the Virginia forces,
Steuben assumed the responsibility for these problems but
the real burden for their resolution rested on Colonel
William Davies.

In November and December, Davies had
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.only been responsible for the operation of the depot at
Chesterfield Courthouse while George Muter was Commissioner of the Virginia War Office and responsible for
recruiting, training, and supply.

Steuben had formed a

dislike for George Muter when he was unable to provide
weapons to the troops in the hectic days when General
Arnold attacked Richmond in January 1781.

From that time

until Muter's replacement in March, Steuben wrote and discussed Muter's incompetence with Governor Jefferson.
Because of this feeling Steuben placed his faith and much
of the work on the shoulders of Colonel Davies.

When

Davies became Commissioner of the Virginia War Office on
March 22, 1781, as well as Commander of the Continental
Depot at Chesterfield Courthouse, his work became even
more involved and his control of supplies even more farreaching.

Only after the arrival of Lafayette, and

relief from the pressure of command, was Steuben able to
work more closely with Davies in obtaining supplies for
the Southern Army, but by then his interest was undermined by his problems with Virginia officials.
Steuben's relationship with the administration
of the state of Virginia had been worsening for some
time, since both the state and Steuben felt that the
full measure of effort was not being given by the other.
He felt that the state government was too critical of
his activities, and the state felt that, given the chance,
Steuben would remove men or arms southward from the state

to the detriment of local defense.

The result was two

forces who at first amicably disagreed but promised each
other all possible aid, then quietly did what they wanted
to

do~

Later the disagreement was to turn to distrust

and then to genuine dislike.
This lack of cooperation was demonstrated when
Steuben and Colonel Senf drew up plans to reconstruct a
fortified battery at Hood's.

These plans were submitted

to Governor Jefferson on January 29, 1781, calling for a
battery of "Eight 24 to 18 pounders and defended in the
Rear by a strong

Re~oubt

for Sixty Men and four or two

Field pieces, mounted in the Angles in Parapet."33
Although the Virginia government approved these plans,
as of February 11 no workmen had been hired to begin to
work on the battery.

On that date Steuben wrote an angry

letter describing the past plans and delays and asked the
governor to "consider the shamefull opposition made to
the last incursion of the enemy" and stated his "wish to
prevent a repetition of the disgrace."

However, he added,

"I can do nothing without the Assistance of the Government. n 34

In his reply, Governor Jefferson stated that

the project was approved, but all technical aspects and
hiring of labor would be left to Colonel Senf.

The delay

which had occurred, he went on to say, "were produced by
circumstances which it was not in our power to control. 11 35
Besides encountering difficulties in cooperation,
Steuben and Virginia governmental officials were also
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beginning to doubt each other's motivations, forming a
more basic mutual distrust.

Steuben was having more

trouble keeping his Continental and State responsibilities
operating in cooperation.

Steuben felt that the reluc-

tance of the state to support his efforts could prevent
his joining General Greene or even perhaps spell defeat
for his army.

The officials felt that any person who

would take a significant percentage of the men and arms
from a state and then leave it could not possibly have
the interests of the state in mind.

Steuben, therefore,

was mistrusted because it was felt that he threatened
the state's security due to his strong loyalties outside
the state.

Steuben, for his part, did not deny he

h~d,

on a number of occasions, indicated his intent to march
south to meet General Greene.
Areas other than support of the troops also gave
the Virginia government reasons to believe in Steuben's
_incompetence.or unreliability or both.

The first was

the incident at Westover, when, during February 1781,
Steuben became embroiled with Mrs. Mary Willing Byrd
over the use of truce flags.

When General Arnold de-

parted Richmond in January, he took forty-nine slaves
from Westover belonging to Mrs. Mary Willing Byrd.

Soon

after, she applied for a truce flag from Baron von Steuben for the purpose of recovering them.· Although Steuben
stated at the time he did not know of the new policy,
Jefferson had issued a letter prohibiting their use for
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~he

recovery of property. i When Mrs. Byrd used the flag,

questions were raised about whether she was· taking advantage of her connections and raising a treasonous correspondence with the enemy.

Because of Steuben's authoriza-

tion, he, too, came under suspicion.36

Second was the

discontent among Virginia officers occurring when General
Weedon was returned to active service.

This· was explained

by Colonel Davies in a letter to Steuben dated February 20,

1781:
I am instructed to advise you our opposition to the
return of General Weedon is not founded upon any
personal pique toward him but that we can never consent to serve in any army where our rights as officers
are so essentially injured • • • and with the same
justice as might General Muhlenberg have retired on
the same occasion and on the same footing with General
we·eaon.37
Steuben's dissatisfaction is shown in this letter
from Steuben's aide, Major William North, of February 23
to General Greene:
The Virginia Line give him (Steuben) the Greatest
Trouble. The Arrangement is nearly completed and
they are continually applying for leaves of absence. • . -. The Baron wishes to be with you. He
had rather Obey in an Army than Command in Virginia. 38
Steuben had been given his mission and had begun
in a positive vein realigning the Virginia depots by
improving the administration of the Quartermaster department and by channeling his efforts to the accumulation of
supplies and troops from Virginia resources.

Soon, how-

ever, he found that the state could afford to provide much
less than was required, serious geographical obstacles to the
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(ransportation of supplies to areas of combat, and that
insufficient manpower was willing to join the Continental
forces.

These problems then created clashes between Steu-

ben and the Virginia government.

The net result was a

constantly struggling support effort which required the
full attention of the Commander.

When warfare took away

Steuben's attention, Colonel Davies provided· the main
emphasis to keep the supplies moving to the troops.

Even

so, since January it had been a struggle just to provide
the supplies needed to support operations in

Virginia~

This struggle was irreparably damaging Steuben's relationship with Virginia government officials-.

The future did

not give indications of improving when, on February 15,
1781, General Greene showed that his army would soon be
needing help for war was once again returning to Virginia.
On February 15, 1781, General Greene wrote Steuben:
• • . the enimy have been daily pressing our rear
and at this moment are in full march for the river,
not three miles from our camp. But we are happy
enough to have the river between us. This will
delay them for some time • . . •
Whether the enimy will pursue us further is uncertain; but as the Army is so great an object I am
rather inclined to think they will, for by the
destruction of this Army they complete the reduction of North Carolina and lay a great foundation
for that of Virginia.jg
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CHAPTER IV
Opportunity Lost at Portsmouth
During the last ten days of February 1781, the
events which most occupied Steuben were the movements
of General Greene and General Cornwallis and the pressing
need to provide more Virginia· reinforcements for the
Southern Army.

Steuben received the news from Greene

of Cornwallis' approach on February 15 and from Governor Jefferson on February 17 that:

"I have this moment

received intelligence that Lord Cornwallis continues his
rapid approach. 111

He immediately followed this news by

instructing the county lieutenants of Lunenberg, Amelia,
Powhatan, Cumberland, and Brunswick counties on February
18 to assemble all the militia and be prepared to march
to the aid of General Greene. 2

By February 21 Lord Corn-

wallis still prepared to cross the Dan River, and the
militia from at least one nearby county had joined with
Genera 1 Greene t o preven t

i•t •

3

By February 25, 1781,

Steuben knew that General Cornwallis had ceased his northward movement after being thwarted in his effort to overtake General Greene by the rain-swollen Dan River.
Nevertheless, the counties of Washington, Montgomery,
Botetourt, Henry, Pittsylvania, Cumberland, Powhatan,
Chesterfield, Dinwiddie, Amelia, Lunenberg, Brunswick,
Prince Edward, Mecklenberg, Charlotte, and Halifax had
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been instructed to call up their militiamen with arms
to aid in the emergency.4

Of the more than two thousand

troops who responded, only half that number had the arms
to be useful to General Greene.

Colonel Lawson even

wrote that he could send another one thousand if they
could be armed.

Before arms were found, the problem

once again lessened in importance with Lord Cornwallis'
movement southward.5
Fear over the approach of Lord Cornwallis made
other aspects of Steuben's job easier.

It was easier

to obtain Continental army recruits during this time.
By February 25 Steuben was able to dispatch "400 rank
and file • • . well armed and tolerably equipped men"
to the South as reinforcements for General Greene's
army.6
During the collection of troops for this reinforcernent, an.incident occurred between Steuben and a
militia colonel which showed Steuben's desire to provide
good soldiers to General Greene as well as the length
to which people would go in satisfying the requirements
for military service.
Men sufficient to form a regiment had, with much
pain, been collected together at Chesterfield Courthouse. The corps was paraded and on the point of
marching when a well-looking man on horseback, and
as it appeared, his servant on another, rode up and
introducing himself, informed the·Baron that he had
brought him a recruit. "I thank you, sir, with all
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my heart; you have arrived in a happy moment. Where
is your man, Colonel?" for he was a colonel in the
militia. "Here, sir," ordering his bo.y to dismount.
The Baron's countenance altered; he saw and feared
the approaching storm. A sergeant was ordered to
measure the lad whose shoes, when off, laid bare
something by which his stature had been increased.
The Baron, patting the child's head with his hand
trembling with rage, asked him how old he was. He
was very young, quite a child. "Sir, you must have
supposed me to be a rascal; an infamous rascal, thus,
to attempt to cheat your country. Take off this
fellow's spurs; place him in the ranks, and tell
General Greene for me, Colonel Gaskins, that I have
sent him a man able to serve, instead of an infant
whom he would basely have made his substitute! Go,
my boy, take the Colonel's spurs and his horse to
his wife; make my compliments, and say her husband
has gone to fight for the freedom of his country,
as an honest man should do."
Colonel Gaskins, fearing the consequences, let the
man escape on the arrival of the corps at the river
Roanoke. The man, upon returning, was not tardy in
making application to the civil authority for re-·
dress. But Governor Jefferson . • • and other gentlemen of the counc~l • • • prevented any disagreeable results • • • •
Eager to secure the capture of General Arnold,
who was still in winter quarters at Portsmouth, Steuben
read with interest a letter sent to Governor Jefferson
from General Lafayette which said, ih part:
I Am the More flattered By the Command Which His
Excellency, General Washington, Has Been Pleased
to Intrust to Me, As Independent of the General
Good that May Be Hoped from this Expedition, It
seems to Promise an Opportunity to Gratify the
High Sense I Have of My Personal obligations to
the State of Virginia.'·8
This letter, received on the last day of February
1781, was acknowledgment that Major-General Lafayette was
coming to Virginia to aid Steuben in a campaign against
General Arnold.

Steuben himself had received a letter

56

from General Washington dated February 20, 1781, with
the information that he had "• •• detached a corps of
1200 men from this army, chiefly consisting of the light
infantry, of course commanded by the Marquis de Lafayette,
which will, I hope, arrive at the Head of Elk about the
sixth of March to embark there and proceed down the bay
to Hampton Roads or the point o.f operation ... 9
Lafayette, in his instructions, was to "open a
correspondence with Steuben, who now commands in Virginia, .informing him of your approach and requesting him to
have a sufficient body of militia ready to act in conjunction with your detachment. 1110
.Steuben was pleased but cautious.

Although

h~

desperately wanted the opportunity to capture General
Arnold, the Marquis de Lafayette was his senior and
would, upon his arrival, .command the troops in Virginia.
Difficult though this would be to accept, Steuben turned
his attention to Portsmouth and made preparations for the
arrival of Lafayette and the "glorious opportunity of perhaps exterminating the Enemy in this country,"

while

capturing General Arnold because "the grand traitor cannot escape." 11
Since General Arnold had arrived in Portsmouth
on January 19, 1781, the troops.under General Muhlenberg
and General Lawson had secured the landward routes from
the town.

There were, however, no vessels to secure the

seaward avenues of retreat.
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It was recognized by Steuben

and everyone else, including General Washington, that
some French ships would be necessary to hold Arnold if
an attack were launched against him.
On February 9, 1781, a small French fleet consisting of a ship of the line of sixty-four guns and
three frigates under Monsieur de Tilly departed Newport
for the Chesapeake to assist against Arnold.

However,

after dropping off eight prizes taken against the British and finding out that the Americans did not consider
themselves yet able to move against Arnold, the fleet
withdrew.

Much to Lafayette's chagrin, the fleet with-

drew all the way to Newport, throwing into question the
. .
· V irg1n1a.
·
· ·
12
.
ent ire
i. dea o f La f aye tte ' s mission
in
Meanwhile, General Washington negotiated with the
French concerning the dispatch of vessels to the Chesapeake to coincide with the- arrival of Lafayette.

At

first, General Washington had received only assurances
that a

ca~tur~d

the Chesapeake.

man-of-war, the Romulus, would return to
By the time the French completed their

arrangements, a fully equipped squadron under Monsieur
Destouches with eleven hundred troops under the command of
Baron de Viomenil was enroute to Chesapeake Bay. 1 3
In spite of the size and strength of that force,
Lafayette, resting with his Continental troops at Head
of Elk, Maryland, since March J, was encountering difficulties obtaining ships with which to move to Virginia. 14

58

Finally

~eaching

Yorktown on March 14, Lafayette sent

the following letter to Steuben:
Here I am, my dear Baron, in consequence of a new
arrangement which I shall explain to you. I anticipate with great impatience the pleasure of seeing you~ and I shall communicate to you the very
important object which has caused me to precede
the detachment. As soon as we have talked with
each other, we shall send an express to the General, who is doubtless impatiently waiting to
hear from us.15
.
.
·
Steuben, meanwhile, had been busy during this
'

period making preparations for the arrival of Lafayette
and the French fleet.

After delivering to the governor

a list of things required at Portsmouth, he proceeded
to Chesterfield Courthouse where he made an assessment
of the military personnel and equipment.

Steuben noted

shortages of clothing for his four hundred troops, the
need and high cost of horses, the shortage of good weapons, the continued need for fortifications at Hood's,
Newport News, and Yorktown, and the need for an overall
plan for a

s~anding

militia of four thousand with good

arms and equipment which could adequately defend Virginia. 16
After submitting these observations on March 5, Steuben
left for Williamsburg where he stayed at the King's Arms
Tavern. 1 7 When Lafayette arrived in Virginia and met
with Steuben, he found that upon his arrival:
• • • Baron de Steuben had been very active in making
preparations, and, agreeable to what he tells me, we
shall have five thousand militia ready to operate.
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This with the Continental detachment (still in
Annapolis) is equal to the business, and we might
very well do without any land force from Newport • . • •
(the troops of the Baron de Viomenil) In your
first letter to the Baron, I wish, my dear General,
you will write to him that I have been much satisfied with his preparations. I want to please him,
and harmony shall be my first object.18
In the letter Lafayette also declined to take immediate
command of the military forces in Virginia.

He felt

that only when his detachment was present, the French
fleet had been deployed off Portsmouth, and the operation was set to begin would he assume command from Steuben.

The two officers continued their effort to obtain

arms, horses, oxen, and artillery for the upcoming
paign.

c~

They also visited General Muhlenberg, who was·

posted at Suffolk.

Together they advanced near enough

to Portsmouth to bring about a skirmish, but a lack of
ammunition prevented their advancing beyond the outposts.
They were in this position on March 20 when .word was
received

tha~·

a fleet had arrived within the Capes.

Lafayette sent a French officer from Yorktown to determine the fleet's identity.

When told these were ·not the

ships expected, "nothing could equal my surprise."

The

fleet, consisting of eleven heavy ships of the line, were
British.

General Muhlenberg immediately took his troops

back to Suffolk, and Steuben began to transport the supplies and equipment and "take Measures for the Security
. 1 es as M"ight Be Expose d . • • • .,19
of Such Ar t ic
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The fleet, after its initial arrival, moved back
out of the Chesapeake on March 24 and returned to LynnHaven Bay on the 25th, bringing with it a convoy of transports bearing a detachment of troops from New York under
the command of General Phillips.

The arrival of these

transports, with every appearance of having .been unmolested by the French, convinced Lafayette and Steuben that
the operation against Arnold was ended.

On March 26

Lafayette wrote General Washington from Williamsburg:
The return of the British fleet with vessels that
must be transports from New York, is a circumstance
which destroys every prospect of an operation against
Arnold . . . • The expenses of this expedition are
very great, and the minds of the Virginians are so
disposed as to make me more obstinate to pursue the
expedition. Upon it~ success great deal depended,
particularly for Gal Gree~~ army. Never has an
operation been more ready [on our side] nor conquest
more certain. But since wz must give it up, I shall
return to Annapolis • . . . 0

Before Lafayette returned to Annapolis, however,
Steuben presented him with a plan for his concurrence.
Although General Phillips had arrived, thwarting American
dreams of capturing Arnold at Portsmouth, there might still
be a way to counter the British and.also to remove the war
from Virginia.

On March 27, General Weedon

w~ote

Governor

Jefferson:
The Honble. Major Genl. Baron de Steuben will lay
before your Excellency, an expedition suggested by
himself, which meets the full approbation of a
Military Board convened on the occation and which
may if agreed to by the Honble:
t~l Executive, in
a great measure terminate the War.
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Which, in S;teuben's words, was that he
• . . march with 2,000 men from Suffolk to Halifax . . . Crossing the Roanoke below the falls .
by pressing on Cornwallis from three different
points w2 2 should oblige him to retire towards
Cambden.
Steuben felt that Phillips would not actually try an
invasion into the interior of Virginia and by the Americans pressuring Cornwallis in North Carolina, Phillips
could be forced to move south to assist and would, therefore, leave the state.

If he did not come to Cornwallis'

aid, then the forces of Greene and Steuben would be
strong enough to defeat Cornwallis.· After his defeat
the combined forces would return to Virginia and defeat
General Phillips.

On March 29, 1781, Steuben presented

the plan .to the Virginia council.

Armed with letters

from Richard Henry Lee and General Weedon approving of
2
the plan, Steuben was convinced the plan would be approved. 3

It came as a bitter blow to Steuben when the council responded:
. taking under their most serious consideration
the ·proposition of Major General Baron Steuben for
sending immediately into North.Carolina a Detachment
of two thousand of the Militia now embodied on the
south side of James River . . . [the council is] of
opinion that . . . the number carry with them bearing
a very great proportion to what will afterwards remain in the State, it will be a matter unjustifiable
in the present circumstances of affairs the enemy 24
having lately received a great reinforcement. . . .
After receiving the information, Steuben wrote
to General Greene on March JO of the plan and the decision while including a copy of the resolution.
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Each of

the three generals had reasons to feel bitter.

Steuben,

while taking the defeat of his proposal as a personal
slight, felt also that the disapproval would have dangerous consequences for General Greene's army if Arnold and
Phillips moved south to join Cornwallis.

He hoped Vir-

2
ginia would not come to "repent it before it is too late." 5
Steuben had, after all, based his plan on the belief that
the British would not attempt a general invasion of the
state, and in fact, would probably not even retain their
base at Portsmouth.
General Weedon expressed bitterness by saying, "I
was fearful our Scheme would be rejected by the Executive
who have not an Idea beyond Local Security.

We must

therefore content ourselves till a force is raised
with
_,
, which they will have nothing to do in point of direction. "

26

Weedon felt that the state government was too conversative to be realistic in its judgment.

He also believed

that military matters should be left to the military.
Greene felt that the Virginia government's decision
was bad for the more all encompassing reason of command
and control, the needs and orders of which take precedence.
If the views of a State are opposed to the general
plan of operations, and the force in the field can
only be employed at such points as they think proper, no officer can be safe in his measures: nor
can the war be prosecuted upon a general scale,
where partial views have an undue influence.27
General Greene also felt, as did Steuben, that hi·s position
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was the most precarious and to deny him support in what
appeared to be a reasonable move was foolhardy for not
only Virginia but the entire South.

Although Governor

Jefferson did call on eleven southern Virginia counties
to support the Southern Army, Greene felt so strongly he
immediately sent a circular letter to these same counties
to send well-equipped militia to him along with provisions
to aid in trying. to "vex Lord Cornwallis if not beat him. " 28
Steuben then decided that there was no longer
anything for him to do in Virginia except to accelerate
the departure of what new levies had been collected.
Furthermore, when they went, he would lead the first
detachment south to join General Greene, leaving Generals Muhlenberg and Weedon to command the troops. 2 9
In the long run, history has shown that it was
the council and governor whose course of action was most
prudent since General Phillips had as his intention from
the beginning the invasion of the interior of Virginia
and

destruc~ion

of supplies bound for General Greene.

In spite of this, Steuben felt as late as June that
Cornwallis would have followed him if he _led forces

di'

away from Virginia.
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CHAPTER V
The Battle of Petersburg
The principal objects of General Phillips' mission to Virginia were to establish a British post in
Virginia and then to render direct support to Cornwallis
by destroying magazines along the James River.

Phillips

was also instructed by General Clinton to examine the
suitability of Portsmouth as his base and if it were unsuited as a fortified station for large ships, he was to
examine Yorktown and Old Point Comfort. 1
and fortification of Portsmouth took three

The examination
weeks-~fro~

his arrival on March 27 until his departure for the upper
reaches of the James River on April 18.
During this period, Bavon von Steuben had occupied
his time with the Steuben plan for reinforcement of General Greene.

On April 1, 1781, he was still at Chester-

field Courthouse taking stock of the availability of
troops.

Th~

calling up of militia to oppose Arnold in

January and to counter General Cornwallis in February
resulted in many militiamen nearing the end of their
service.

Steuben had also concerned himself with the

Virginia Quartermaster Department and also the

perfor~

mance of George Muter, the Commissioner of the War 9~fice
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of Virginia, whom Steuben had long felt was to blame for
many of the supply difficulties of the army. On March 22
Muter was replaced by William Davies. 2 Steuben envisioned
that Davies would bring about sweeping changes in the
quartermaster department; but, since Davies also held his
old job at Chesterfield Courthouse, the span of his responsibilities was too broad to see an immediate improvement of any magnitude.3
The armies, both Continental and state, were in
need of everything--arms, lead, cartridges, and clothing.
Although the ships under Monsieur de Tilly had brought a
few merchant ships carrying goods, the supplies in Virginia were still nearly non-existent.

This scarcity of

supplies, lack of money for payment, and inactivity
before Portsmouth also caused desertions to increase
markedly.

By April 15 Steuben was forced to write General

Washington that he was obliged to undertake the defense
of the

count~yside

against three thousand regular troops

with nothing to oppose them but militia.

Those militia

who had served since the beginning of the invasion had
discharged themselves by this time; consequently, General
Muhlenberg was left on the south side of the river with
only seven hundred men and General Weedon on the north
side with about six hundred men.
A very great evil resulting from the invasion is,
that it stops th·e recruiting for the army. So long
as a county has any militia in the field,
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that county is prevented from drafting; and as most
of the counties have had part of their militia either
here or with General Greene, little or nothing has
yet been done. • . . [to raise troops] Only fiftytwo have yet come in and of these some have already
deserted. . . . When they do com4, I am still much
at a loss of what to do for arms.
Frustration over provisions and troops was still
causing Steuben to consider leaving Virginia..

One such

letter to General Greene, written from Chesterfield Courthouse on April 2, revealed his feelings.
If I preferred my own inclinations to the public
interest, I should immediately set out to join
you; my desire to act under your immediate directions, and the disgust I have for my situation
here, are motives equally forcible to urge my departure hence.5
Again these thoughts would be interrupted.·

This time· it

was General Phillips who brought the war to Steuben.
As early as April 15, Steuben had been aware that
movement by General Phillips up the river was only a matter of time.

He had been told that work on the fortifi-

cations at Portsmouth was nearly complete and that construction on some flat-bottomed boats had begun.

In

anticipation of the coming expedition, Steuben submitted
a plan to Governor Jefferson on April 17 detailing the
ste~s

to be followed if theBritish decided to attack

within the state.

Written at Chesterfield Courthouse, it

called for the two thousand militia under the.command of
General Muhlenberg to be armed and ready to oppose the
British on whichever side of the James River they chose to

Hood's for exemption from militia duty, it was·; too late.
In addition, William Davies and Colonel James Innes, commanding some of the militia in the field, became so convinced that General Phillips would move against Petersburg
and Richmond that they tried desperately on April 16 to get
wagons and teams impressed to transport over ·qne hundred
fifty wagon loads of supplies from the depots at Petersburg
and Chesterfield Courthouse to safer locations. 8

Steuben

completed the confusion by ordering the dispersal "as high
in the country as necessary" of the supplies accumulated
for use in the Portsmouth operation.

All in all, when

Phillips moved, it came as no surprise; but, as

usual~

the

supplies which would soon be so desperately needed were
deposited some distance from where they would be needed,
·including as far away as Point of Fork.9
On April 16, 1781, Phillips embarked his men on
twenty-five flatboats, each carrying one hundred men, and
began moving upriver with General Muhlenberg following
Steuben's o~ders, keeping track of their movements. 10
The twenty-five boats, preceded by the gun boat,
··Benetta, paused at Old Point Comfort, then moved on and
took the gun emplacement at Burwell's with only minor
opposition.

Following its occupation, Lieutenant-Colonel

Simcoe with the Queen's Rangers was directed to march
toward Jamestown and, if possible, surprise any batteries
which might wait in ambush.
and rainy night:
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Having marched during a dark

• . . on the 20th, Lieutenant Colonel Abercrombie,
with the light infantry, proceeded up the Chickahominy in boats; Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe, with a
detachment to York; Lieutenant Colonel Dundas, with
another detachment landed at the mouth of the Chickahominy; and Major General Phillips and myself landed
with part of the army at Williamsburgh, where about
five hundred militia were posted, who retired upon
our approach. The militia at York crossed the Diver
before the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe, who
made a few prisoners, spiked and destroyed some cannon, and next day returned to Williamsburgh.
On -the 22nd, the troops marched to Chickahominy. We
were met on· the road, five miles from the mouth of
the river, by Lieutenant Colonel Dundas with his
detachment; this evening the troops, cavalry, artillery, etc., were re-embarked. The next morning we
·
were [re] joined by Lieutenant Colonel Abercrombie
with the light infantry, who had been ten or twelve
miles up the Chickahominy and destroyed several armed
ships, the state shipyards, warehouses, et6~i1
· Later on April 22, the British fleet passed the
deserted battery at Hood's.

By April 23 the fleet was

off Westover, and on April 24 they reached City Point and
disembarked.

During this part of the expedition, General

Phillips, according to Simcoe, had
primary

emphasiz~d ·th~~e·

obj~cts:

. . . to surprise, if possible, a body of the enemy
stationed at Williamsburg, at any rate to attack
them. ~ . .
. . . to obtain possession of Hood's -battery, now
reported to be closed, without unnecessary risk; to
open all obstructions on the James river, and to
seize the arms said to be at Prince George Court
house.
. . . to gain Petersburg for the purpose of destroying the enemy's stores at that place, and it is·
public stores alone that [were] . • . intended to be
seized.12

70

Steuben, however, remained at Chesterfield where
he was attempting to recruit a force of cavalry until
certain of Phillips' destination.

Henrico, Prince George,

Dinwiddie, Goochland, Hanover, Powhatan, Cumberland,
13
Amelia, and Chesterfield counties were called up.
On April 21

Steuben~

commanding the forces, had

begun to move the troops into a position allowing flexibility of movement but still principally influenced by an
anticipated move toward Petersburg.

He directed the mili-

tia assembled at Richmond to remain in place, but those
in Manchester were ordered to move to Petersburg to relieve others who were to be'"m6ved

:ta·

. " 14

Bland"·s. Ordinary.

Steuben believed that while Phillips was definitely
headed toward Petersburg, he was also:
. . . of the opinion that the Enemy mean for the
present, but to occupy the Neck of Land between
the York and James River as high up as Williamsburg
. . . I am endeavoring to have the fortifications
at Hood's put in the best state of defense possible;
and making what other preparations in my power, to
oppose the Enemy should they advance on this side
[southside] of the James River.15
Steuben also felt he had time to undertake the instruction
and drill of his troops and ordered that they be "exercised in marching in the morning and the manual in the
afternoon. 1116
That same day, however, the drilling and marching
at Chesterfield Courthouse came to an end when Steuben
received notice of the British passing Hood's and their
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immediate approach to Westover.

He directed Colonel

Innes to ''approach the James River" and to oppose them
at Turkey Island if they should land on his side.

The

militia at Manchester was then ordered to take up position at Osborne's and for the militia in Richmond to
split, with-one half going with Innes at Turkey Island
and the other half to Long Bridge.

Unfortunately, Innes

was out of his expected position and north of the Pamunkey
River and on his way toward Richmond.·

He had crossed the

Pamunkey River to counter the British during their forays
downriver.

On April 23 he heard that the British were

headed for Richmond so he turned in that direction but was
then unable to return in time.

He did not get to Osborne's

until April 25, too late to oppose the British at Petersburg.

The forays of the British caused numerous misunder-

standings and uncertainty over where to deploy troops.
This uncertainty also led to a fear among the Americans
that improper actions might bring on a repeat of the British invasion in January, when no opposition was presented.
Compounding this situation was a breakdown in communications-a possibility that should be avoided in wartime.

The final -

result was that for a time on April 23-24, the commanders
were unaware of everyone's exact location.

Innes did not

know where Steuben or Phillips were; Steuben did not know
where Innes was. 1 7
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By the evening of April 23, most intelligence

had Phillips at Westover and heading for Richmond. ·

By April 24, Steuben himself felt it necessary to enter
firsthand into the activity.

He went to the shore

opposite Westham and found twenty-three flat-bottomed
boats and thirteen topsail vessels.

While he watched,

the ships began to move upriver but have Steuben no indication as to which side of the river
to disembark the troops.

they intended

When the ships disembarked their

entire force at City Point in the evening, all doubt
as to their intentions was finally removed.

Steuben's

prophesy in his plan had been proved to be correct.
Steuben, as overall military commander, :then made the
decision to fight.

The troops under Steuben with which

he would oppose the British probably now were down from
the thirteen hundred to less than one thousand for Steuben,
in a letter to Greene on April 25 and confirmed by one
from Jefferson to Washington and from Muhlenberg to
his brother stated that there were "not more than One
Thousand men to oppose th~ Enimy advance. 11 18

The force

probably consisted of some five hundred men, less the
Isle of Wight and Nansemond militia, who marched to
Petersburg on April 20. 21

Added to this would be the

troops and cavalry brought from Chesterfield Courtho.use,
probably about one hundred.

The final addition to the

army would be the militia who arrived at Petersburg
or who came from Manchester and Richmond in accordance
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with Steuben's instructions.

Since the militia from

Richmond and Manchester did not turn out in number and
those soldiers who did were poorly armed, the bulk
would have come from militia assembling at Petersburg.
This number would probably exceed the arms available.
Since the number of arms given to troops under Muhlenberg
was about one thousand, this was probably an approxima22
tion of the number of troops ready for battle.
These
one thousand troops available to counter Phillips' twentythree hundred were an insufficient number to attack ships
unloading troops.

Steuben therefore notified all militia

and Continental commanders that Blandford, a small settlement between City Point and Petersburg, would be the
"place of defence and the Bridge of Pokohuntas for our
retreat. 112 3
On the morning of April 25, Generals Steuben and
Muhlenberg with their assembled troops faced the army of
Generals Phillips and Arnold.

The two American generals

had already mapped out the strategy to be used, and Muhlenberg was as prepared as possible.

They planned to

meet the British advance force with an American advance
force.

Once the battle had begun, the lead force would

retire and be joined by a larger force of troops.

They

would engage the British, then retire and join a still
larger force.

This would continue until all forces had

entered the conflict and one side or the other left the

74

field.

In preparation for the action, Steuben and Muhlen-

berg called for a sufficient amount of rum to be taken
from the stores or wherever it could be found to give a
hogshead to each regiment.

After it was distributed to

the troops, they were told to "drink and fill your can24·
teens
. we are going to fight today." -· . Thus fortified, the Americans awaited the conflict.

During the

morning the British approached to within three miles of
the American lines, and by noon they made their first contact.

The British formed their lines and general firing

began at three' o'clock.· It continued until after five
o'clock, when "the superior number of the enemy and a
want of ammunition obliged me to order the retreat, and
the bridge to be taken up, which was executed in the
greatest good order.

Notwithstanding the fire of the

enemy's cannon and musketry, the troops . . . retreated
about ten miles on the road leading to Chesterfield
Courthouse. 112 5
One of Steuben's soldiers, Daniel Trabue, gave
an account of that afternoon's events:
Our advance Guard met the army about one mile from
town. This advance was a Sergeant and 12 men; his
orders were when he would meet them, to fire when
they came to 200 paces of them, and then to retreat
to where they would meet with a larger squad. They
did so, and met about 100 who had the same orders,
so these 100 men fired when the Enemy was fully
200 yards Distant. . . •
The British fired their cannon, but our men were
so scattered that it did not cause much Damage,
while the Enemy's loss was considerable. At length,
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the British charged on our men, and then retreated
to where the main Army was. Our men were behind a
Ware House, a hedge, and Dikes and Fences . • . • ·.
We left Petersburg when the sun was nearly 2 hours
high in the evening.
I was now 25 miles from home.
We marched towards where I lived up toward our
[Chesterfield County] Court House, we went about 7
miles that night and encamped at dark, where there
was plenty of wood and water, and all went to cooking and eating.26
·
On May 6 Jefferson, in writing to General Washington, stated that the Americans had:
. . . disputed the ground very handsomely two hours,
during which time the enemy gained One mile only,
and that by inches. Our troops were then ordered
to retire over a bridge, which they did in perfectly
good order. Our loss was between sixty and seventy,
killed, wounded, and taken. The enemy's is unknown;
but. from circumstances of nrobability it must ha~e
been·about equal to ours.21
·
General Muhlenberg, in his account of the battle, stated
that:
. . . the enemy approached the town in two columns
and were met by our light infantry about a mile
from town, where the skirmish commenced, and every
inch of ground to the bridge was warmly disputed. •
At length they cannonaded us so severely, that we
broke up the bridge and retreated· in the greatest
regularity~ after maintaining the fight for nearly
two hour_s. 8
Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe, in his Journal, listed the
casualties of the battle as the Americans having been
"said to have lost near an hundred men killed and wounded,
while that of the British was only one man killed, and
ten wounded of the light infantry. 112 9, During the main
part of the battle, the British had only been able to
advance about one mile toward Blandford Church in two
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hours.

Steuben had placed his cannon on Archer's Hill,

and from there, covered the skirmish well until overmatched by numbers.

Steuben crossed the river, tore down

the Pocahontas Bridge, and headed north to Chesterfield
Courthouse.

3P

After crossing the river the morning of April 27,
Arnold, with the 18th and 76th regiments and Simcoe's
Rangers, proceeded to Osborne's, where rumor had it that
numberous stores were located and near which was a marine
force sent to oppose any additional progress of the British
fleet up the James River.

At the same time, General Phil-

lips marched toward Chesterfield Courthouse.

This two-

pronged attack on Chesterfield County was the most destructive to date of the war in Virginia.

On April 26,

after the skirmish at Petersburg, Phillips.destroyed some
"four thousand hogsheads of tobacco, one ship and some
vessels on the stocks, and in the river. 11 31
Arnold, with Simcoe and the Queen's Rangers, the
76th and 80th Regiments, and part of the Yagers marched
to Osborne's on April 27, arriving about noon.

"Finding

the enemy had very considerable force of ships four miles
above Osborne's drawn up in a line to oppose us, I sent
a flag to the commodore, proposing to treat with him for
the surrender of his fleet, which he refused, with this
answer,

'that he was determined to defend it to the last

extremity.' 11 32 ·The British then opened fire from the

77

water's edge at a· distance ·of barely one hundred yards.
Though opposed by fire from several ships and musketry
from the opposite shore, the British were able to capture
or sink the entire fleet of Virginia ships.

Two ships,

three brigantines, five sloops, and two schooners loaded
with tobacco,

cordag~

and flour were captured, and four

ships; five brigantines, and a number of smaller vessels
were burned or sunk.33
General Phillips and his troops marched to the
Continental depot at Chesterfield Courthouse and on
April 27 and 28, laid waste to all the barracks, warehouses, _and shops.

They "took what they wanted and

burned the balance--even the Courthouse they burned. 11 33
Steuben, in the meantime, just barely had time to remove
th~

troops to Richmond and to send stores to Point of

Fork, about forty miles up the James River from Richmond.35
The Virginia government likewise adjourned to Charlottesville during the emergency.
General Arnold left Osborne's on April 29 and
moved up the south

b~nk

of the river to Ampthill, the

home of Archibald Cary, five miles west of Richmond.3 6
The next day General Arnold rejoined General Phillips
between Cary's. Mills and· Warwick.

Together they marched
to Manchester, across the river from Richmond. 3 7
Steuben, moving just ahead of Phillips, mangged

to cross the James into Richmond just barely ahead of the
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British arrival at Manchester.

General Lafayette, who

on April 8 had been ordered to rejoin General Greene
and aid him in any way possible, had been directed back
to Virginia to take command in the state, and after making forced marches from Head of Elk, he joined Steuben
38
in Richmond at about 5 p.m. on Sunday, April 29.
Phillips and Arnold, having destroyed twelve
thousand hogsheads of tobacco at Manchester, prepared
to cross into Richmond; but when word came of the arrival
of General Lafayette the day before, they changed their
minds.

Looking across the river upon their arrival,

"from whence they had a view of M. Fayette's army encamped upon the heights of Richmond .

. . [the BritishJ

wheeled their columns and proceeded back downriver to
Cary's. 11 39

This was followed by a further movement

through the settlement of Warwick in Chesterfield County
to Falling Creek, where it meets the James River.

The

settlement at Warwick, at that time larger than Richmond,
suffered severe damage when the British put the town to
the torch.

According to General Arnold:

We.destroyed a magazine of five hundred barrels of
flour, and Colonel Cary's fine mills were destroyed
in burning the magazine of flour. We also burnt
several warehouses, with one hundred and fifty hogsheads of tobacco, a large ship and a brigantine
arloat, and three vessels on the stocks, a large
range of public ropewalks and storehouses, ~nd sometan and bark houses full of hides and bark.· 0 ·
Still in Richmond, collecting and reorganizing
the scattered militia, Lafayette and Steuben could only
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watch the destruction to Manchester and Warwick.

It was

only after the British moved on that the American generals
left Richmond in pursuit.

After leaving Warwick, Phillips

and Arnold proceeded next past Osborne's to Bermuda Hundred,
where the army embarked on the ships on May

2~

Once em-

barked, the British gave every intention of returning downriver to Williamsburg or Portsmouth.

General Lafayette and

Baron von Steuben were willing to let them go.

The fleet

proceeded south to the waters off Jamestown, where preparations were made which gave the impression that the troops
were landing.
Americans.

This apparently was

a

feint to confuse the

To a degree, it was successful since Lafayette

and Steuben moved their camp on May 3 to Bottom's Bridge on
the Chickahominy River, sixteen miles southeast of Richmond.
This change in location gave Lafayette more flexibility to
move toward Jamestown while still being near enough to
Richmond to withdraw if Arnold and Phillips returned north.
On May 6 a boat arriving from Portsmouth came alongside General Phillips' boat.

Immediately after its depar-

ture, the order was given to turn and proceed up the James
River.

The ship had delivered a message from General Corn-

wallis written at Wilmington on April 24 stating his intention to proceed by land straight north and join Phillips
and Arnold at Petershurg.

The courier stated further that

Cornwallis had departed Wilmington and was expected to
arrive on May 6 at Halifax, where he would cross the Roanoke River and enter Virginia. 42

Bo

41

The fleet bearing Phillips and Arnold reached
Brandon's where all the troops but the light infantry
landed and moved west toward Petersburg.

The light in-

fantry continued to City Point, where it disembarked
and then also moved toward Petersburg.

The approach of

the main British Army, together with the forces of Phillips and Arnold, could have brought great pressure on the
American forces in Virginia, who could not match in
experience or provision the British forces.43

Two things,

however, changed the circumstances of the deployment.
First General Phillips had been taken ill during the ascent back up the James River, with the illness advancing
swiftly.

After May 7 he was rendered incapable of command.

Secondly, the battle of Cornwallis and Greene at Guilford
Courthouse had reduced the strength of the British forces
to the point where reinforcement was necessary.
Lafayette and Steuben, who had been following the
British, were forced to retrace their movements.

Upon their

arrival at the James River on May 8, they found that Phillips and Arnold had already entered Petersburg.

While at-

tempting to cross the river also, the Americans encountered
elements of the British right flank which extended all the
way to the James.

During the course of the ensuing clash, men

in Lafayette's army were said to have cannonaded the British
lines doing some damage to the house where Phillips lay
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dying.

British authors years later accused Lafayette of

"inhumanity" for this action, but it is probable that if
Lafayette had known he was there, no such firing would
have occurred.44
Lord Cornwallis, having been met by LieutenantColonel Simcoe and the Queen's Rangers at the Roanoke
and told of General Phillips' failing health, marched
across the Meherrin and Nottaway Rivers, almost straight
north towards Petersburg.

Off to his right marched the

one hundred eighty cavalry and sixty mounted infantry of
Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton.45

Arriving in Petersburg

on May 20, the army was met by Brigadier-General Arnold.
General Phillips died on May 13, 1781, and was buried in
an unmarked grave in Blandford cemetary.
Throughout the Battle of Petersburg and the retreat through Chesterfield Courthouse, Steuben was in
overall command.

What kind of commander was he when his

actions are viewed in retrospect?

Whether he was accept-

ing advice from General Muhlenberg or the idea was his
own, the method of battle used at Petersburg gave him one
of the best possible chances for success when facing an
enemy force over twice as large but he did fail to utilize
a possibility open to him while at City Point before meeting
the British at Blandford.·- - If he had attacked Arnold. as
he was disembarking troops, he would have had them at a
disadvantage.

Instead of the ships firing on the Americans,
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,

they would not have been able'to employ cannon for fear
of hitting other ships and their own troops and this
would have at least given Steuben an added advantage
later in the day when he had fallen back to Blandford.
Complete success at City Point would have forced the
British to abandon the operation and take what men and
ships remained and returned to Portsmouth.
After Steuben recrossed the Appomattox River into
Chesterfield County, there was no natural barrier to the
British advance.

Once again the superiority of the Brit-

ish Army would prohibit Steuben from meeting Phillips on
equal terms, and he would,have no choice but to retreat
to Richmond, where the James River provided some security.
In so doing, however, Chesterfield Courthouse was abandoned to the enemy·-_ In S-teuben' s defense, the militia
had so often retreated when a firm stand would have meant
victory that it was difficult for a commander to place
the type of faith in them that would have been required.
to attack at City Point, fall back to Blandford, re-form
and attack again.
The war in Virginia had experienced the caution
of Arnold and Phillips, who never strayed too far from
their ships.

Virginia's next experience was to be the

battle-scarred and fast moving warfare of Lord Cornwallis.
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CHAPTER VI
Road to Yorktown
With the arrival of Lafayette in Virginia on
April 29, Steuben was confronted with new challenges.
Until that time he had been in command of the state
and Continental forces; then Lafayette was.

He still

had the responsibility to recruit for the Southern Army,
but one task would be removed.

Steuben summed it up

when he wrote Greene that he:
. looked upon myself discharged from attending
the Operations in the field, the more especially
as he had three Brigadiers under him.
I therefore
again turned my attention to collecting and equipping the Recruits, and, with the Marquis's consent,
fixed the general rendezvous at Albemarle Barracks. 1
As one of his first actions after the arrival of
Lafayette, Steuben sought to recover the supplies scattered into the countryside before Phillips' raid on
Petersburg and Chesterfield County Courthouse; but since
these locations were not considered particularly safe,
Steuben, Lafayette, and Jefferson concurred in making
Albemarle Barracks the new collection point for the recruits.

Many Continental supplies were already stored

there or at the warehouses at Point of Fork, a state depot,
located in Fluvanna County, about fifteen miles down the
river from Albemarle Barracks.
Steuben's purposes.

This area was ideal for

On May 10 Steuben had moved.his head-

quarters to Charlottesville because it was far enough from
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the scene of the fighting to provide relative safety; it
was near the homes of some friends; and it was near the
Virginia government which had moved there May

7.

This

selection was criticized by some vocal Virginians who
position~:to

felt that instead of placing his troops in a

defend Virginia, Steuben was making it more difficult.
The threat was from the East instead of the mountains.
This additional.criticism, which was leveled against him,
in addition to that resulting from his inability to keep
Phillips from Petersburg, Chesterfield Courthouse, and
Manchester, made Steuben even more unhappy in Virginia.
Steuben was told by Jefferson that fewer troops
could be expected because many counties had militia in
the field and so long as they did, the county would not
draft men for Continental duty.

When Steuben asked Jef-

ferson what he believed would be the maximum he could
receive from counties, he replied that he was confident
fifteen hundred men could yet be provided.

Steuben then

ordered the men he had already collected to go to Albemarle
Courthouse to be clothed and armed.

At this time Colonel

Davies wrote him a letter in which he said that Albemarle
Barracks was a very poor choice for receiving recruits.
It was difficult to reach by land, had no natural protection such as woods, and the barracks were nearly destroyed.
Davies then suggested that the state depot at
Fork would be much more suitable.
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Po~nt

of

After meeting with

Lafayette at Wilton and obtaining his concurrence, Steuben
ordered his recruits to Point of Fork where they would 'be
prepared to join General Greene or General Lafayette as
needs dictated.

Steuben arrived at Point of Fork on May

20 and spent the next week there and at Albemarle collect2
ing troops and equipment.
On May 26 Steuben's troops
numbered 470 and he wrote Greene that they were ready to
m~rch

and that "I shall be happy if I get off from here

the 4th or 5th of June • .

. I must beg you to determine

by what route I shall join you."3

Steuben waited for

instructions, but they did not come.

Unfortunately for

Steuben, they had been intercepted by the British. 4
On May 24 after only four days rest in Petersburg,
Cornwallis crossed the James River at Westover and headed
north after Lafayette.

By May 28 the force was sixteen

miles east of Richmond at Bottom's Bridge; May 29, at New
Castle; and on May 20, at Hanover Courthouse.

Lafayette,

trying to avoid a direct confrontation until General Wayne
could get to Virginia and join him, kept retreating.

As

'

he wrote to General Washington on May 24:
. . . was I to fight a battle I'll be cut to pieces,
the militia dispersed, and the arms lost. Was I to·
decline fighting the country would think herself
given up.
I am therefore determined to skarmish,
but not to engage too far, and particularly to take
care against their immense and excellent body of
horses whom the militia fears like they would so.
many wild beasts . . . . was I any ways equal to the
ennemy, I should be extremely happy in my present
command
But I am not strong enough even to get
beaten. 5
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Lafayette had another reason for fighting a delaying action.

In early April, when Lafayette had received

his orders to return to Virginia, General Washington had
also instructed General Anthony Wayne to march his Pennsylvania troops south and join with Lafayette.

Wayne, how-

ever, had been delayed by bad weather and discontent over
a lack of supplies and pay among his troops, as had Lafayette during his.march in April.6
As the force marched south with a strength df
eight hundred instead of the fifteen hundred with which
Wayne had expected to march, doubts began to be raised as
to whether this detachment could provide the support Lafayette was expecting.

Wayne also experienced difficulties

arising from his efforts to hurry.

As·he crossed the Poto-

mac at Georgetown on June 1, his six field pieces fell into
the river, necessitating a halt.

It had rained so hard

for several days that the army was bogged down, as was
also the case on June 3 when he was passing Leesburg.
It was not until June 10 that Wayne was able to join
Lafayette at Racoon Ford on the Rapidan River.7
Cornwallis, with Tarleton and Simcoe, watched
for Wayne's arrival with a

c~rtain

degree of concern.

Though his estimated seven thousand troops opposing Lafayette's three thousand gave him more than a two-to-one
advantage, the British knew that the arrival of Wayne
with his nine hundred men with Steuben's five hundred
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would more nearly equalize the armies in strength and
cause Lafayette to seek the initiative.8

General Corn-

wallis therefore formulated a plan in which he dispatched
Tarleton and his 180 dragons with 70 mounted infantry in
support, to "proceed . • . before daybreak tomorrow to
Old Albemarle Courthouse, where you will destroy any
stores you may find.

If you find no other stores of any

consequence . . . • you will cross • . • [the Rivanna] and
strike a blow at Baron Steuben."9

Lieutenant-Colonel

Simcoe, with three hundred men of the Queen's Rangers,
with two hundred of the 7lst Regiment

w~~

sent directly

to Point of Fork_ to oppose Steuben on June 2, 1781.

·

Tarleton moved the seventy miles to Charlottesville in only forty-eight hours and attacked there on
June

4.

Luck was with.the assembly as Jack Jouett, .rid--

ing ahead of Tarleton, was able to warn nearly every
delegate.

With little time to spare, all but seven mem-

bers were able to escape west over the mountains to
Staunton. 10

Though unable to capture the assembly, Tarle-

ton did destroy a thousand flintlocks, four hundred barrels
of powder, clothing, tobacco, and such public records as
could be found. 11

Having completed his mission in Char-

lottesville, Tarleton turned south with his prisoners and
marched toward Point of Fork to rejoin Lieutenant-Colonel
Simcoe.
At five o'clock on June 3, Steuben received word
that a British force moving up the river was approaching' -
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from the direction of Goochiand Courthouse.

Anticipating

that these troops were intent on attacking Point· of Fork,
Steuben put aside for the moment his preparations to join
General Greene and feverishly began removing all the
stores across the James River.

Guards were posted to warn

of the arrival of any British troops, and the supplies,
food, and arms were loaded onto boats and canoes and along
with the troops transferred to the south side of the river.
During the day General Robert Lawson arrived with some
two.hundred fifty militia who were also put to work.

By

evening almost all the Continental stores had been moved
when Colonel Davies arrived to oversee the movement of
the Virginia state supplies.

With everyone working, the

remaining' supplies were moved across and put on wagons or
set on the shore.

By early on the morning of June

4, vir-

tually all supplies and troops had been transported across
the river.

Only about thirty men remained on the north
side when the British appeared. 12
Moving rapidly, Simcoe covered the last four miles
to Point of Fork in about two hours, arriving at noon on
June 4.

Simcoe had been very careful in his approach to

.avoid detection by capturing or detaining everyone with
whom the troops came in contact.

As a result, he was able

to capture the troops who remained in the camp.

He was

also able to prevent Steuben from knowing the size force
\

which came.

Simcoe saw that Steuben had already crossed

the river but that quantities of supplies were still sitting
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on the

shore.~

He decided upon a ruse to make Steuben

think Cornwallis had arrived with his entire army,
believing that in so doing, Steuben might abandon the
supplies and retreat into the countryside.

During the

day Simcoe sent the scarlet-clad troops of the 7lst Regiment into the camp with a three-pounder cannon with instructions to fire one accurate shot across the river at Steuben.
They were then to begin building rafts to cross the river.
The remainder of Simcoe's troops were to spread out,
remain under the cover of the woods, and at dark build
sufficient numbers of campfires to give the impression of
a large force. 1 3
·All of this activity,,when coupled with the intelligence furnished by some of his
effect on Steuben.

staf~

had the desired

While he actively worked to remove

those supplies and troops he could to a safer location,
such as Albemarle Barracks, he nevertheless decided soon
after dark to abandon what was left and to leave Point of
Fork without confronting Simcoe and to move on to Willis
Creek. 14
The
efforts
..,,..-

fol~owing

morning Simcoe, pleased that his

had been successful, sent a detachment of light

infantry across with saddles and instructions to destroy
the supplies on the shore.

Then they were to mount what-

ever available horses could be found and actively pursue
Steuben far enough to give him the idea that the ·whole
British army was behind him. 1 5
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Estimates of the losses in supplies iesulting from
the British attack varied.

Simcoe's estimate was that:

. . . two thousand five hundred stand of arms, a large
quantity of gunpowder, case shot, &c., several casks
of saltpetre, sulfur, and brimstone, and upwards of
sixty hogsheads of rum and brandy, several chests of
carpenters' tools and upwards of four hundred intrenching tools, with casks of flints, sail cloth and waggons, and a great variety of small stores . . . . . There
were taken off, a thirteen-inch mortar, five brass
eight-inch howitzers, and four long brass nine-poundel6,
. . . all French pieces and in excellent order. . . . ·
The Continental storekeeper, taking inventory after the
raid, estimated the losses as:
. . 68 boxes of coarse cloths, 60 pair of leather
breeches, 1 small bale linen--2,000 yards Canvass, 1
Hhd Checks soldiers hatts, 1 box containing linen
and Coarse thread, 2 small bales of Blankets containing about 75, 2 Hogsheads of Coffee, and 1 small.case
of Tea.17
When these totals were given to the Virginia delegates,
they were outraged.

To them, Steuben had once more demon-

strated his disregard for Virginia's well-being.
As Steuben moved away from Point of Fork, he added
still more fuel to the fires of

critici~m

Virginia government officials.

On June 5 a letter had

levied by the

been written to Governor Nash of North Carolina requesting
supplies be provided to support the troops he was taking
south to the Southern Army.

Steuben sent the dispatch

with a Captain Kirkpatrick, who arrived in North Carolina
/-

on Friday, June 8.

.

Steuben, meanwhile, left Willis.Creek

and continued south to Prince Edward Old Courthouse, then
to Charlotte Courthouse, arriving on June 9.

Here, in a

letter to General Greene, he stated his intention to march
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south and join the Southern Army in accordance with his
orders bringing with him five hundred fifty recruits
and informed Greene that he had left General Lawson with
six hundred militia to counter the British. 1 8

Upon his

arrival at Granville, North Carolina, Captain Kirkpatrick
found that Governor Abner Nash was not preseht ·so he delivered the request to General Jethro Sumner.

Sumner

indicated his willingness to support Steuben's request but
told Kirkpatrick that it was surprising news to hear Steuben was moving south when he had orders from General Greene
to bring the new Carolina levies and march north to Virginia
if Cornwallis entered the state.

Kirkpatrick immediately

sent the information Sumner had given him back to Steuben,
who received it on June 10.

Steuben halted his march at

Cole's Ferry on the Staunton (Roanoke) River to await instructions from either Greene or Lafayette. 1 9
During all this time, public outcry had grown over
the loss of supplies at Point of Fork and was growing still
more over·
ward.

~teuben's

Steuben

~as

apparently precipitate departure southby no means oblivious to these develop-

ments, but for some days he remained at Cole's Ferry hoping
word would come from _Greene.

During this wait, Steuben

addressed himself to the militia in southwestern Vi~ginia
I

in a circular letter.

Addressed to the county lieutenants

of Prince Edward, Cumberland, and Amelia Courthouses,
which had been established as places of rendezvous for
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recruits since Chesterfield Courthouse and Point of Fork
had been destroyed, Steuben entreated everyone to:
• • • get together every man in your county, who can
possibly be armed • • • • If we succeed in collecting
such a body of militia as can offer resistance to the
enemy, I have not the least doubt that we shall not
only preserve this part of the State from their depredation, but that in a short t~~e they will be driven
back to their shipping. • • •
On June 13 Steuben received a letter from Lafayette:
I request you, my dear sir, that you will immediately
return this way, and with the Continentals and militia under your command, hasten to form a junction with
us. I am afraid General Greene's letter requesting
you to remain with us has not yet got to hand, but
unless you have received orders· subsequent • • . I can
assure you his desire was then to form a junction.21
Though Steuben still had not received word from General
Greene, he now had definite indications that he was to
remain in Virginia.

Steuben left Cole's Ferry on June 12

after he received the information from Sumner and proceeded
to Prince Edward Courthouse arriving there on June 13.
then received Lafayette's letter.

He

With definite instruc-

tions, Steuben crossed Carter's Ferry June 16 and marched
across Goochland County.

On June 19 Steuben safely re-

joined Lafayette in Hanover County at Colonel Dandridge's. 22
General Wayne had also joined Lafayette on June 10 so the
American army had become a formidable force of some four
thousand men.

The four American generals--Lafayette,

Wayne, Muhlenberg, and Steuben--watched intently to see
what Cornwallis' next move would be.
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To their

su~prise,

he moved back through Richmond on June 21 and continued
back down the north side of the James River.

Going first

to Bottom's Bridge, then to .New Kent Courthouse on June 22,
he slowly made his way toward Yorktown and Williamsburg
by June 25. 23 The reason behind this move was a directive from General Clinton, Commander of British forces in
America, for Cornwallis to fortify a position in Virginia
and then to send the remaining troops to New York.

Clinton

believed that the growing strength of French and Americans
around New York placed his army in danger.

Even if it did

not, he wanted to launch a campaign against Philadelphia
and the Virginia troops would aid him considerably. 24
Along the route of march, there were several .
instances when the American troops in their eagerness
formed to do battle with the British, only to be disappointed.

One occasion happened on June 18, the day before

Steuben joined the army near a place called Meadow Bridge,
.,

located on the

Ch~ckahominy

almost due north of Richmond.

General Muhlenberg, in the advance, was pressing Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton from the rear.

During the course of

the march, he approached too

and was met by an

clo~ely

element of the British Cavalry.

By the time the Americans

could form, the British had moved off without any serious
engagement.

Two members of the First Pennsylvania Regi-

ment, a Captain John Davis and Lieutenant William Feltman, made virtually the same observation when they left

94

camp at sunset to surprise a "party of Tarleton's horse
• • • • continued to daylight, but on our arrival found
they were gone some hours • . • • (traveled) 13 miles. 112 5
After this false alarm, the march after Cornwallis was
resumed.

On June 22 the Americans came to Richmond.

Much of the city still lay in rubble as a result of the
British attacks, but there was enough activity to allow
Captain Davis and Lieutenant Feltman the opportunity to
go to town for the purpose of "playing billiards and
.
,26
d ri.nk.ing wine.'
From June 2J-26 the Americans proceeded east to
the Pamunkey, then south toward Spencer's Ordinary just
northwest of Williamsburg following the army of Corn-.
wallis.

On June 26 the advance guard, under Colonel

Richard Butler, arrived at Spencer's Ordinary while Lafayette, Steuben, and the rest of the army remained
encamped at Bird's Tavern.

A British force under Lieu-

tenant-Colonel Simcoe, returning from a night-foraging
march, ran into Butler's force at Spencer's Ordinary.
The Americans charged Simcoe's men and then fell back to
allow the riflemen to press the advantage.

The British

gave way under the attack with losses reported by General
Cornwallis of thirty-five and by the Americans of nine
dead, fourteen wounded.

Following the confrontation,

both sides claimed victory; the Americans were left in
possession of the field and the strategic advantage. 2 7
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General Cornwallis continued his movement toward Portsmouth while the American army, remaining a safe distance
away, followed along behind.

On June 28 Cornwallis was in

Williamsburg while the American army rested at Tyree's
Plantation twenty miles northwest of Williamsburg.

On

July 4, 1781, Cornwallis began to move his troops from
Williamsburg to Portsmouth. 28
From there would come the decislon to move to
Yorktown, where the British army in Virginia met its defeat.

Steuben had no role in this part of the conflict.

The fatigue of the marches, the conflicts between Steuben
and the state, and the worries over support for his army
had climaxed in an illness which removed Steuben from. the
battlefield from about July 2 until September 3, 1781.
The seriousness of the illness and the pain and
discomfort it caused were excellent reasons for Steuben
to think only of his recovery.

Unfortunately, many peo-

ple and the Assembly of Virginia had become thoroughly
disgusted with what they felt were the errors in judgment
demonstrated by Steuben at Point of Fork.

In the days

immediately following the event, public outcry against
Steuben grew to exceptional heights.

Even Lafayette, who

knew the problem of field command, wrote his personal
feelings to General Washi_ngton on June 18:
The conduct of the Baron, my dear General, is to me
unintelligible--Every man woman and child in Virginia
is roused against him. They dispute even on his
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courage but I cannot believe their assertions. I
must however confess that he had 500 and odds new
levies, and militia, that he was on the other side
of the river which the freshet rendered very difficult to be crossed . • • the greater part of the·
accounts made Simcoe 400 strong; that our stores
were destroyed by 30 or 40 men • • • that the Baron
went to Staunton River about 70 miles from the Point
of Fork--that the militia abandonned him and • • •
the new levies deserted from him because they did
not like his maneuver.29
Later, however, after hearing Steuben's account
of the affair, Lafayette would change his belief and
would state that "the Lordship did us no harm of any
consequence" at Point of Fork.JO

It was learned, for

instance, that the muskets referred to were arms needing
repair, not new ones.

Davies also reported that the

clothing and supplies had been moved to Staunton.

Only

remnants of needed items were abandoned and of those that
were left behind, most belonged to state rather than Continental forces.

Furthermore, he stated on June 23:

The Assembly were at first much mortified at the
losses we had sustained by the rapid incursions of
the enemy, and in their discontent were really clamorous; they moderate in their vexation, as they have
since found that the mischief done by the enemy was
inconsiderable compared with the· plunder of the in- Jl
habitants, of whom we expect to recover a great deal.
The damage was done, however, and the dislike and distrust between Virginia and Steuben grew even stronger.
In the course of days which followed, Steuben gave the
following as an explanation of his actions:
I could not see what could hinder the enemy from
detaching a sufficient party to disperse my force
and render themselves master of the stores • ·• •
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I thought it to be absurd ~aking a bravado with
a small number of bad troops against such a force,
while the marquis, being near one hundred miles
off, could make no diversion on that side. I,
therefore, gave orders for dispersing the stores
in such a manner that only part could fall into
the enemy's hands on any route they could take,
and sent off three officers successively to acquaint the marquis of my situation. I wrote circular letters to the county lieutenants to call
on their militia, and leaving General Lawson at
Charlotte Courthouse, I marched the recruits to
Cole's Ferry, on the Stanton.32
,
In May 1781, after the events at Point of Fork,
the House of Delegates passed a resolution:
That the Honorable Major General Marquis La Fayette
be requested to cause an inquiry to be made into the
conduct of all persons under his command, who may be
supposed, either by neglect or otherwise, to have
been instrumental in the loss of the said stores. 33
If this resolution had meant only what it said,
the investigation would have either been made, Steuben
absolved of blame, and the matter forgotten; or Steuben
would have been found responsible and given a rebuke.

It

would not be the first time a military officer or even a
general had been investigated for alleged improprieties.
This inquiry, however, was the culmination of a series
of disagreements over policy, tactics, and motivation.
Benjamin Harrison, Speaker of the House of Delegates, wrote
to Joseph Jones, a Virginia delegate in Congress on June
8, 1781:
We have 600 fine men under Baron Steuben which he will
not carry into action. What are his reasons, I know
not, but I can assure you his Conduct gives universal
disgust and injures the Service much, the People complaining and with reason that they are draged from
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their Families at a time when they are most wanted
to make bread for them, whilst the Soldiers they have
hired at very great expense lay Idle. In short my Dr.
Sir, his conduct does great mischief and will do more
if he is not recalled, and I think it behoves you to
bring it about. I assure you it is the wish and desire of every man that this Event should take place.
I believe him a good officer on the Parade, but the
worst in every other respect in the American Army.34
Archibald Cary, Speaker of the Senate, had also
written to Jefferson on June 19, 1781 that some three
members of the council had observed that ". • • Steuben
deserves to be h~nged for his Conduct.' 35
11

This was the final straw.

In summarizing and evalu-

ating Steuben's actions from his point of view, it had been
disturbing when Virginia officials, upset by Arnold's freedom of movement and Steuben's lack of opposition in January
had heaped criticism on Steuben and the army.

In March, the

inability of the Americans to capture Arnold at Portsmouth,
even with Lafayette, again brought criticism to the army.
Then when the Virginia government disapproved, on March 29,
his plan to take two thousand troops southward to attack
Cornwallis, he returned the criticism by openly questioning the motives of the Virginia authorities.

This sudden

disapproval of the plan when approval had seemed certain
because Generals Lafayette, Weedon, Gouvion, Greene,
Washington, and Lee had given their concurrence, led
Steuben to the conclusion that the government and the
chief executive were making this a matter of personai
rebuke.

When Phillips and Arnold invaded and destroyed
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Osborne's, Chesterfield County, and Warwick, Steuben was
praised with Muhlenberg for the resistance given to the
British.

Soon, however, the critics again became vocal

and stated their beliefs that no matter how many Americans
could be put against the British, they would be unable to defend the state from destruction.
Steuben was also frustrated and upset when accused
of not having Virginia's interests at heart in his decisions as military commander.

The Virginia officials made

no secret that they felt his actions were often dictated
by a desire to leave Virginia for the South and take all
manpower and materiel resources with him when he went.
Finally, with the resolution requesting an investigation
of his actions at Point of Fork, Steuben lost his remaining patience and consideration for the Virginia government.
The unfortunate part of the alienation was that
the greater part of the accusations and counteraccusations by both the Virginia officials and Steuben were misunderstandings and a somewhat natural desire to find something or someone else upon whom to affix blame.

As time

passed and further information became available, each
point of disagreement was cleared.

Those losses the Vir-

ginia authorities laid· so quickly at Steuben's feet were,
when the facts of the

bat~les

were made known, brought

on by other underlying causes--lack of arms, untrained
militia, and ineffective intelligence.
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Steuben's.main

faults lay in the area of inexperience and an excess of
caution.

The damage was done.

Everything Steuben had

undertaken had either been unsuccessful, criticized, or
misinterpreted.

Once the seed of doubt had been placed

in people's minds, the facts could easily be arranged to
suit the point of view.

While Steuben felt his actions

had been reasonable under the circumstances and the Virginia officials were incorrect or too hasty in the evaluation, the Virginians held quite an opposing viewpoint.
As this doubt grew in both camps, so did each
side's provocations and accusations, thereby creating
more ill-will.

As early as April but certainly by mid-

June, Steuben was convinced that his usefulness was a.t an
end.

His disputes with the officers of both the militia

and the Continental line as well as his conflicts with the
Virginia governmental authorities had alienated many
people.

It was perhaps only his illness in July that

kept him in Virginia and permitted him to play a part.
in the siege of Yorktown.

'
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yHAPTER VII
Yorktown
During the first few days of July 1781, Baron von
Steuben became progressively ill, when, as Steuben described
it:
Fatigue of body and mind and the hot climate, so
unfavorable for my bilious temperament, have so
affected my health, that about two weeks ago, I
was obliged to withdraw and take treatment for a
skin eruption which became quite serious • . . • an
eruption of blood, which covered my whole body.l
Steuben, following the onset of the illness, took
leave of Lafayette and traveled to the home of friends
made during his travels in northwestern Virginia.

In his

letters he tells of staying at a country house near ~Mr.
(John) Walker's whom you (Greene) met at Philadelphia, a
member of Congress and his father, who is my physician. 112
Dr. Thomas Walker, father of John Walker, lived
at an estate called Castle Hill in Albemarle County, Virginia.

The

~state

was located on the main road from

Keswick to Gordonsville in the northern part of the county.
This estate, then comprised of some eleven thousand acres
of land, had originally been land granted by George II to
Nicholas Meriwether.

Upon the birth of the Walker chil-

dren, the main estate was subdivided into the estates of
Turkey Hill, Peachlorum, Belvoir, and Kinloch.

John

Walker owned the estate of Belvoir, which was located
about four miles southeast of Castle Hill.

Built on the

original grant also was Grace Church and a small village
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consisting of Shay's store, Bowle's Shop, and an ordinary.
Steuben had first met John Walker while he served
as a representative to the Continental Congress in Philadelphia.

On a number of occasions between October 1780

and July 1781, Steuben had been at Castle Hill for visits
with the Walkers and it was here to this complex of estates that Steuben came when illness caused him to seek a
quiet, safe haven--a haven far removed from the ravages
of war and the Virginia government--where he could rest
and, at the same time, receive medical help.3
There are few letters written by Steuben from
early July until late August, most probably because of
the severity of his condition.

There are, however, a

number of letters to him with instructions to recruit
Continental troops or requesting advice.

One of these was

a letter on July 12 from General Daniel Morgan telling
Steuben

that.Lafayett~

wanted him to take action to obtain

items of equipment for the cavalry.

On July 16 Baron von

Steuben replied:
Colonel White has just handed me your letter of
the 12th instant.
You must certainly, Sir, have misunderstood the
Marquis, as he knows that I am here for the recovery of my health and not for the purpose of
equipping the cavalry. Major (Richar~) Call has
the superintendance of that business.
During this period of pain and idleness, Steuben once
more turned his thoughts to General Greene and the
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Southern Army.

On July 23, 1781, in a letter to his long-

time friend, Richard Peters, he poured out his frustrations:
I have seen so many atrocous villanies since I have
been in this state that I can no longer be surprised
at anything. (In regard to my actions at Point of
Fork) • . . I will be forced to expose the dastardliness of the government, the absurdity of the law, and
the pusillanimity of those who should have executed
them. • • . When my health is restored, I intend to
once again join the southern army.5
In August, however, his

~ealth

steadily improved and by

mid-month he was able to write to General Greene that:
I have received your favor of the 19th of July, in
which I am ordered to join you. If it had pleased
God, my dear General, that this order had reached
me some months sooner, I should have escaped a great
deal of pain and chagrin. • • • My duty and inclination would have engaged me to set out immediatej.y on
the receipt of your letter, had not my ill health
prevented me. • • • The heat of the season, uneasiness of mind, and a thousand other things have so
used me up that I cannot yet sustain the fatigue of
a journey. I shall, however, prepare to ta~e up my
line of march the last of this month • • • .
Though Steuben's illness forced him to leave the
army for

Ch~rlottesville,

the main American army, which

then consisted of 4,155 troops, with Colonel Christian
Febiger in command of Steuben's troops, continued to
pursue Cornwallis toward Portsmouth.7

Along the way two

skirmishes, the battles of Spencer's Ordinary and Green
Spring Farm, occurred.

These battles delayed the arrival

of Cornwallis' army in Portsmouth until July 14.

Corn-

wallis was returning to Portsmouth in preparation for
sending troops for the reinforcement of General Clinton's
army.

He had learned in May from dispatches that General
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Clinton planned an attack on: Philadelphia
from New York and Virginia.

us~ng

troops

As originally envisioned,

the Virginia troops would advance up the Chesapeake to
Head of Elk, then march overland toward Philadelphia.
General Phillips, who was to lead the expedition had
approved of the plan contingent upon being given two
thousand more men.

Clinton agreed and sent eighteen

hundred men to Virginia who arrived about the same time
Cornwallis came to Petersburg.

When Cornwallis took com-

mand, he heard of the proposed campaign, but disagreed
with the idea entirely, even though it had previously
been approved.

In fact, Cornwallis wrote a letter on May

26 voicing strong opposition to the plan and stating:that
11

if offensive war is intended, Virginia appears to be the

only province in which it can be carried on, and in which
there is a stake. 11 8
Clinton, however, would not be dissuaded from his
plan of action.

When Cornwallis completed his· campaign in

Virginia, he received a letter on July 8, repeating the
request for troops.

Following its receipt, Cornwallis

moved to Portsmouth to comply with Clinton's order.9

The

troops embarked on July 20 but did not sail as planned,
for Cornwallis received another letter from Clinton dated
July 8, which stated that he had no intention of imposing
his will over that of Cornwallis and that he would accept
Cornwallis' decisions. 10

By July 26 Lord Cornwallis,

in a letter sent to Admiral Thomas Graves, Commander of
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the British fleet

the stage for the siege of Yorktown

was set.
• • • the Commander-in-Chief having signified to
me that he thought a secure harbor • • • of so
much importance in the Chesapeake, that he wished
me to possess one • • • • I shall immediately siege
and fortify the ports of York and Glouchester.ll
On August 2 Cornwallis sailed for Yorktown and began the
task of fortifying the town and the surrounding area.
General Washington had likewise begun to make
plans.

As early as May 21, he had met with Rochambeau

at Wethersfield, New York, to discuss a joint operation
against the British, probably at New York.

Final prepa-

rations required only a strong French fleet to guard the
seaward front.

On June 13 the final piece fell in place

when Admiral de Grasse announced his fleet would arrive
• 'Am er1can
•
.
1n
wa t ers 1n
mi"d -summer. 12

While planning the campaign against New York,
Washington also received numerous letters from Virginia
informing him of the progress of Cornwallis' campaign in
Virginia, but Washington felt Clinton was closer and his
defeat would insure victory.

On August 14, 1781, a fate-

ful letter from Admiral de Grasse informed Rochambeau and
Washington that his vessels would sail directly for Chesapeake Bay and not New York.

Early in August Washington

knew of the occupation of Yorktown by Cornwallis.

A fleet

to protect the seaward front presented the opportunity.
Washington wanted.

The scene of the campaign shifted

~apidly from New York to Virginia. 1 3 Washington and
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Rochambeau then requested Admiral the Comte de Barras to
bring his fleet to join that of de Grasse.

These two to-

gether would be stronger than anything the British could
send. 14
General Washington, with his army, broke camp at
Dobb's Ferry on August 19 and marched toward a junction
with Lafayette.

Washington's progress toward Virginia

was steady but since he was moving to avoid detection by
the British, it was not particularly direct or rapid.
Arriving at Williamsburg on the 14th, Washington had an
army of some two thousand men made up of infantry from
New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey, with Hazen's Regiment, Rhode Island's Regiment, and a regiment of
t6 use in the coming siege.

art~llery

Also marching south to join

this relatively small force was another formidable army
of four thousand under General the Comte de Rochambeau. 1 5
The real concern of the generals was that since
the plans _ha? been set in motion, Cornwallis must not be
allowed to escape before the armies could merge against
him.

General Washington wrote on August 21 to Lafayette

that it would be his responsibility to insure that Cornwallis did not move from Yorktown before he could arrive. 16
General Lafayette moved his troops under Generals
Wayne and Muhlenberg to carry out their orders.

Wayne was

sent south of the James River to guard the south bank and
the roads leading southward, and Lafayette with Muhlenberg
moved along the north bank of the James to Holt's Forge.
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On September 1, Lafayette wrote Washington that the French
fleet had arrived and that:
I hope you will find we have taken the best precautions to lessen His Lordship's chances to escape-He has a few left but so very precarious that I
hardly believe he will make the attempt--if he does
he must give up Ships, Artillery Baggage part of the
Horses all the Negroes--He must be certain to lose
the third of his Army • • • • ~7
After the arrival of the Comte de Grasse, Lafayette dispatched a letter on September 3 to Steuben, informing him
that the French fleet with a corps of thirty-three hundred
troops under the Marquis de St. Simon was in the bay and
that "he would be charmed to see me at his headquarters
at once. 1118

Whether it was a desire to become involved

in a new action against the British or an apprehensio? that
to leave Virginia and move south would only further damage
his reputation, Steuben wrote to Greene:
I beg you, my dear General, to permit my assisting
this expedition which is preparing. Considering
how small the number of your troops is, :1r think my
presence may be dispensed with for some time; nevertheless, if you judge it necessary and should you
think tne motives which induce me to stay insufficient, the moment I receive your commands, I shall
begin my journey. Tomorrow I shall join the Marquis.
I shall give him every assistance in my power.19
Once he was in Williamsburg, Steuben reported to
General Lafayette but did not see him since the marquis
was ill and unable to see anyone.

Nevertheless, when

a meeting did take place, Lafayette accepted his offer
and together the generals awaited the arrival of General
Washington.

While they were waiting St. Simon and de

Grasse approached Lafayette with the suggestion that it
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was pointless to wait for the arrival of Washington since
St. Simon had thirty-one hundred soldiers and eight cannon,
while de Grasse also offered eighteen hundred sailors for
Lafayette's use against Cornwallis.

Though this offer was

tempting, Lafayette refused, suggesting that a "frontal
assault on prepared fortifications would be very costly in
lives, especially without the aid of siege artillery and
might possibly be a failure. 1120
When Washington arrived at Williamsburg on September 14, he found Steuben hard at work again on the drill
field. 21 By September 25 all Continental and French troops
were on hand and Washington had designated, along with his
two other senior generals, Benjamin Lincoln and Lafayette,
Baron von Steuben as a division commander.

To quote Gen-

eral Washington:
• • • The Baron from the warmth of his temper, had
got disagreeably involved with the state (of Virginia) and an inquiry into a part of his conduct
must one day take place, both for his own honor
and their satisfaction. I have for the present
given him a command in this army which makes him
happy • . • .22
On September 28 the combined armies moved to within two
miles of Yorktown.

Steuben's division, located in the

center, had the French to his left and first Lafayette
then Lincoln, occupying the position of honor, to his
right.

His division was deployed along the Warwick

Courthouse Road, almost due south of Yorktown.

His

force consisted of two brigades, sappers, miners and
a few recruits from Delaware.

The First Brigade under
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Brigadier-General Anthony Wayne of Pennsylvania had 275
men in the First Battalion (Pennsylvania) under Colonel
Walter Stewart, 275 men in the Second Battalion (Pennsylvania) under Colonel Richard Butler, and 3.50 men in the
Virginia Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Gaskins.

The Second Brigade was under the command of Briga-

dier General Mordecai Gist of Maryland.

His·brigade con-

sisted of the .5.50 men in the Third Regiment (Maryland)
under

Lieutenant~Colonel

Commandant Peter Adams and 450.

men f'r:om the Fourth Regimen·t (Maryland) under . the c omfuand
.

.

.

of Alexander Rexburg •. In support were .50 miners and sappers and 60 Delaware Recruits under Captain William McOf the total 2010 troops,. approximately 617 were
sick or unfit.for duty as the· siege began. 2 3

Kennan.

In addition to this command, Steuben also acted
as advisor.on siege warfare.

He was the only American

officer who had ever taken part in a regular siege;
therefore, when the necessity arose to consult and act in
common with the French staff, Steuben acted to insure the
Americans were fairly and equitably participating in the
action.

Steuben also was undoubtedly consulted when Gen-

eral Washington drew up his instructions for the conduct
of siege operations since Washington had never participated in this type of warfare before. 24
By September 29 the combined American and French
armies, totaling some sixteen thousand soldiers, .had
moved into place around Yorktown.
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The engineers, having

examined the topography; of the area, had briefed the division commanders on where and how each should locate their
lines. 25 Once in place, all of the divisions including
Steuben and his troops spent the time preparing for the
siege.

On September JO Steuben was officer of the day and

therefore responsible for overseeing offensive preparations.
During the course of his tour, two spectators were killed
while they were moving about observing the British.

Fear-

ful of the safety of other spectators, Steuben issued
orders that no one except those required to do so, were
allowed to check out the enemy lines. 26 His troops meanwhile, along with the French and anyone who could be put
to the task were busy making gabions, fascines, and stakes
as well as offloading and bringing up the cannon. 2 7
During the first few days of October, the fire
from the British lines was quite intense.

On the nights

of October 1 and 2 General Wayne, one of Steuben's brigade commanders, along with his troops manned the American
lines.

During his period of duty the firing was particu-

larly severe with not only the cannon in the city but the
ships firing as well.

By_ the end of Wayne's duty at sun-

down on October 2, the British had expended 351 rounds.
Once Wayne was relieved of this duty, he rejoined Steuben
and the rest of the division moving the American cannon
to the fortifications.
By October J, Steuben had been presented With one
more worry.

He had received instructions to prevent any
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of his troops from visiting any houses in the vicinity
since almost everyone was infected with smallpox or some
other illness. 28 On October 4 General Wayne advised
Steuben that two deserters he had encountered while checking new British defenses along the York River had reported
extensive illness in Yorktown with two thousand of the
British troops being hospitalized. 29
Throughout October 5 the preparation of the breastworks and positioning of cannon continued.

Finally, every-

thing along the American and French lines was in readiness.
On October 6, the siege officially began for the combined
armies with the opening of the first parallel.

Steuben,

again officer of the day, joined by his inspector Major
William Galvan, oversaw the preparations being made.JO
Lincoln, the senior major-general, was designated to lead
the ceremony opening the parallel.

With Lincoln were six

regiments selected from the right side of each brigade and
two brigadier-generals, Clinton and Wayne.

At six o'clock

in the evening, Steuben watched as Lincoln with the Americans and Baron de Viomenil with the French formed the line.
There were four thousand three hundred in all--fifteen hundred to do the digging and twenty-eight hundred to act as
gurars.Jl
During the first night, little firing was directed
toward the troops.

By morning a long trench ran from near-

ly the center of the enemy's fortifications at a distance
of about five hundred fifty yards all the way to the York
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River.

Supporting it would be four redoubts, two in the

French area and two in the American, and five batteries.
Also, On October 6, General Washington issued General
Orders with the fifty-five siege instructions.

Because of

Steuben's experience with siege warfare, it is most probable that he advised Washington on the procedures or even
assisted in writing them.

This is especially likely when

considering the relative inactivity of Steuben during the
first few days of October.

The next day, October 7, was

spent with reinforcing and strengthening the parallel so
that the artillery so badly needed would be mounted.

On

this day Lafayette entered the trenches "with the tread of
veterans, colors flying, drums beating, and planted their
standards upon the parapet ... 3 2 The siege was underway in
earnest.
On October 8 Steuben's division manned the trenches.
In so doing, he preserved the order in which each general's
troops took the trenches on a rotating basis of once every
three days.

Steuben and his troops would next have the

duty October 11, then the 14th and finally the 17th.

This

rotation was also followed for assigning details for fatigue
duty.33
Steuben's responsibility on this day was the completion of the trenches and the fortifications for the
cannon.

Difficult though this was, Steuben was able.to

take his first day in the trenches and turn it into a
lesson in siege warfare for the other senior officers
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present •
• . • the general of the trenches enJoins it in the
strictest manner, on the officers to remain with
their respective commands. The officers commanding
platoons are, particularly during the night, to keep
their men together, with their arms in their hands.
In case the enemy should sally, the whole of the
troops are to form eight paces in the rear of the
trench; and as the enemy came into the trench, the
respective platoons will rush on them with the bayonet; when they are repulsed and retiring, then, and
not before, the troops will occupy ~he banquette,
and fire at them in their retreat.3~
During the day his division was successful in completing
a large battery on the extreme right of the parallel,
located on the York River.

This battery contained_ three

twenty-nine pounders, three eighteen pounders, two teninch mortars, and two eight-inch howitzers.

Simultan-

eously the French completed another battery similar to
Steuben's on the left end.

These two batteries combined

with a third in the center and a smaller one on the left
and right of center were ready for use when Steuben was
relieved by General Lincoln on October 9.

At 3 p.m.

General Washington is said to have fired the first cannon,
whereupon the French and American batteries began to return the fire they had so incessantly received from the
British since the investment began.35

It is not known

exactly whether Washington fired from the French or American battery, but the fire which followed silenced many
British guns.

Some of the fire was aimed at British war-

ships sitting in the York River beyond Yorktown forcing
several to move to the Gloucester side.
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On October lQ the first parallel was completed and
two new batteries, one on the extreme left and another in
the center, were completed.

They had been delayed because

sufficient horses and wagons were not available to simultaneously pull all the guns and ammunition required for
the parallel.

Following completion of the batteries on

the right, the Americans loaned their horses and wagons to
the French to speed up the work.3 6

These new batteries were

equipped with the heavy thirty-two pounder siege guns.

The

power of these weapons when they opened fire on October 10
came as a frightening surprise to General Cornwallis.

In

a letter to Clinton on October 11, he stated:
On the evening of the 9th their batteries opened·, and
have since continued firing without intermission, with
about forty pieces of cannon, mostly heavy, and sixteen mortars, from eight to sixteen inches. We have
lost about seventy men, and many of our works are considerably damaged. With such works on disadvantageous
ground, against so powerful an attack, we cannot hope
to make a very long resistance.37
The sheer volume of the huge shells crossing the sky from
the American· to the British lines made a "very beautiful,
though at the same time dreadful appearance." JS
October 11 marked a significant point in the siege
when the second parallel was opened at a distance of only
two hundred fifty yards from the British fortifications.
On this day Steuben arid his division were once more in
the trenches.

Steuben instructed each of his men to carry

a shovel, spade, or grubbing hoe, with every second man
to also carry a fascine.

By morning the division had con-

structed an entrenchment seven hundred fifty yards long,
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three and one-half feet deep and seven feet wide.~9

All

this time the cannonading on the American and French lines
was becoming more intense as each subsequent battery became
operational.

The British, too, responded with a "very

heavY fire of • • • shot and shells going over our heads
in a continual blaze the whole night. 1140
At no time were the men occupying the trenches at
all safe.
the new

Even Steuben and Wayne from their position in

paralle~lp,

came under fire from a British battery.

The Baron, perceiving himself in danger, :~ :~ -~ threw
himself into a trench. General Wayne in the jeopardy
of the moment fell on him. The Baron, turning his
eyes, saw it was his brigadier: "I always knew you
were a brave general," says he, "but I did not know
you were so perfect in every point of duty. You
cover your general's retreat in the best manner possible.1141
As a result of this near miss, Steuben issued an
order designed to keep the men alert.

It said:

The Soldiers (are) not to be allowed to lay down in
the night, but remain as in the daytime with their
arms in their hands. Officers (are) to remain at
their respective posts. No fashines (are) to be
untied nor made use of in any mann~r whatsoever but
for the construction of the Works.42
.
By October 12 Steuben was ready to be relieved
after the digging and firing of the night before.

Just

after noon Steuben's troops marched off with drums beating
and flags flying.

The main activity this day rested with

the incredibly accurate fire of the artillery.
It is astonishing with what accuracy an experienced
gunner will make his calculations, that a shell shall
fall within a few feet of a given point, and burst at
the precise time, though at a great distance. When a
shell falls, it whirls round, burrows, and excavates
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the earth to a cpnsiderable axtent, and bursting,
makes dreadful havoc around. 3
The fire was intense enough for General Cornwallis to add
a postscript to his letter of October 11 to General Clinton
that "we continue to lose men very fast." 44
The next day, October 13, Steuben's division once
more went on fatigue detail to build and repair defensive
works on their own lines.

Several defectors from Yorktown

reported that the British in the town have been thrown
into total confusion by the firing. 45
On October 14 Steuben's division mounted the trenches
early in order to relieve the light infantry of Lafayette,
who were to take part in the main action of the day. 46

The

engineers had reported to Washington that sufficient ·damage had been done to the two advance British redoubts that
they might now be successfully stormed. 4 7

Lafayette and

the Baron de Viomenil each were selected to command a special force, to attack the redoubts, and if possible, add
them to the American defenses.

At sundown the two forces

moved out of the American lines.

At 7 p.m. the redoubts

were attacked with Hamilton leading the force which captured the one nearest the river (no. 10) and the Baron de
Viomenil the one away from the river (no. 9).
taken in about ten minutes. 48

Each was

With the redoubts gone,

the second parallel was completed to the right all the
way to the York River, and when the American artillery was
moved forward, it fired almost point blank into the British
fortifications. 4 9 Steuben remained in the trenches until
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about one o'clock in the afternoon of
October
'
(

15. During

this morning General Washington, Rochambeau, and others
visited the lines to see the completed parallel.50

While

there the New York Brigade marched into the captured redoubt with drums beating·and flags flying, but Steuben
hurried out and silenced the activity to prevent their
being fired upon by the British.5l
At three o'clock in the morning of October 16, the
British attacked the American lines with the intention of
doing what Hamilton and Viomenil had done on October 14,
capture or destroy some unfinished batteries.

Attacking

the French line to Steuben's left, the British were able
to storm one battery before being driven back into Yorktown.

Unsuccessful though this effort was, it gave Corn-

wallis the will to make an effort to escape before surrendering.

Later during the night of October 16, Cornwallis

transferred some of his troops by boat across to Gloucester
Point, but a storm arose about midnight which prevented
any other attempt to cross.

The storm was "Almost as

severe a storm as I ever remember to have seen," said
Elias Dayton.5 2 At dawn, the troops who had crossed came
back to Yorktown and were met with devastating cannon
fire from the American lines.53
As Steuben's men mounted the trenches at eleven
o'clock a.m. on October 18, 1781, a feeling of expec.tation
was in the air.

At about ten o'clock a scarlet-coated

drummer had mounted the parapet and began to beat a "parley."
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With him was an officer waving a white flag, who, aft.er
being blindfolded, was escorted to General Washington·.•
The British proposal was to suspend hostilities for twentyfour hours and appoint commissioners to determine the terms
of surrender.

At first Washington made no response and

sent the officer back.

At four o'clock another flag was

sent, requesting a cessation of four hours.

Washington

replied that he would suspend firing for two hours in· order
that Cornwallis oould submit his terms in writing.

The

next day, October 18, Lafayette approached Steuben's position to relieve him.

Steuben refused, stating that Euro-

pean tradition dictated that he remain on duty until the
surrender was signed or broken since the first contact for
surrender had been received during his guard.

Although

Lafayette went to Washington to protest, Steuben was adamant and Washington allowed him to remain.55
Although Cornwallis complied, it was Washington's
terms which were insisted upon.5 6 On October 18, while
Steuben remained in the trenches, the commissioners considered the articles of surrender.

The morning of Friday,

October 19, the articles were submitted to General Cornwallis with a note from Washington stating his expectation
that the articles would be signed by eleven o'clock in
the morning and the troops would march out to surrender
their arms at two o'clock in the afternoon.57
About eleven o'clock the articles were signed by
Cornwallis and the siege of Yorktown was ended.
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By noon

the flags were struck , and the first American unit moved
into Yorktown.

Ensign Ebenezer Denny of the Pennsylvania

troops, under the command of Colonel Richard Butler, was
marching at the head of the American column carrying the
regimental flag.

Once inside the British fortifications,

Denny moved to the parapet to plant the colors.

Before

he could do so, however, Steuben seized the staff and
ceremoniously stuck it atop the works.

At the time the

troops cheered at the sight of the flag in place, but
Colonel Butler, watching from the rear, became very angry
and cursed Steuben as an "arrogant, ignorant, knavish
foreigner ... 5 8 Later Butler sent Steuben an insulting
message which would probably have resulted in a duel if
Washington and Rochambeau had not been able to calm things
down.59
Between 4 and 5 p.m., the British troops, with
arms and baggage, standards covered but with drums beating, marched out to surrender.

The British army marched

on the Williamsburg Road past the combined armies of the
French and Americans, who were aligned by regiments in
par'ade.

In front of each regiment were the generals and

staff officers.

The left of the line included the Ameri-

cans with Generals Washington, Gates, Steuben, and Wayne.
Then it was over.

The war in Virginia had come to an

end--no more battles to be fought, no more honors to be
won.

On October 20 General Washington wrote a le.tter

of congratulations, which especially commended the three
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division

comman~ers--Lincoln,

Lafayette, and Steuben.

Baron von Steuben reassessed his position in Virginia and in the Continental army.

As a result, on Nov-

ember 5, 1781, he wrote General Greene that he would be
unable to join him •
• • • Pity me then, my dear General, when I assure
you that I am prevented from following my duty and
inclination by extreme indigence--an utter incapacity of any longer su~porting myself and family.
(aides, retinue, etc.)
Hitherto, I have supported myself by drawing on
account fo much paper money as served to subsist
my family • • • • The real value of what I have
drawn does not exceed 150 Guineas. I lost three
of my own horses & have obliged to purchase others
at an enormous price and my camp equipment after
18 months campaign is nearly destroyed.
Under these circumstances, my Dear General, I mu.st
necessarily quit. I have obtained permission to.
go to Philadelphia to settle my accounts with Congress. After four years' fatiguing service, it is
right I should know on what footing I stand. If I
have merited nothing I am content. My pay they
will not dispute • • • •
I go then, my Dr General uncertain if ever I shall
have the happiness of seeing you again • . . • 60
When_ the. siege of Yorktown was ended and Cornwallis surrendered, the final chapter was written in the
inquiry into Steuben's conduct.

Before leaving Virginia,

Steuben tried to find out the particulars of the attempt
by the Virginia Assembly to reinstate an investigation of
his conduct at Point of Fork, but his letter to Governor
Nelson, who was soon to resign the governorship, went
unanswered.
The first week of November, 1781 saw Steuben leave
Virginia.

He had not come very far down the .. road to
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glory and great possessions,· he had not successfully
defended his honor for his actions at Point of Fork, nor
had he commanded troops under General Greene.

He had how-

ever, been field commander and had the satisfaction of seeing his opponent General Cornwallis, walk before the assembled Americans and surrender his enemy.
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CHAPTER VIII
Conclusion
In this thesis I have examined the professional
ability of Baron von Steuben to determine how successfully
he accomplished his primary and secondary missions.

His

primary mission, that of providing men and supplies to the
American Southern Army, had been given to him as a result
of his success in training the American Army at Valley
Forge.

His secondary mission, as Commander of the Virginia

Continental and militia forces and as field commander under
Lafayette and Washington, was the result of need and
cumstances.

cir~

When the British mady the need for a comman-

der paramount he was the senior military man available.
In the overall evaluation of Steuben during this
period it is necessary to weigh his accomplishments against
his failures and determine by either number or significance
his degree of accomplishment.

In accomplishing his goals,

Steuben must be judged at best a limited success in meeting
his primary mission and except for Petersburg, unsuccessful
in meeting

hi~

secondary one.

His success comes from the fact that he recruited
425 men and sent them to General Greene, and he selected a

quartermaster staff which was as able as any who had served
in Virginia.

Steuben also reemphasized the need for defen-

sive works to protect Richmond and established Chesterfield
Court House in an effort to improve the Virginia system of
supply depots.
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These accomplishments had occurred in
December 1780.

Novemb~r

and

During this period, Steuben had foreseen

complete success for his mission since everything had been
in proper order.

He was hopeful that all the needs of
General Greene could be met. 1 His initial introduction into Virginia had been assured when General Greene, himself a
popular figure in the State, ·intorduced him to public officials and in so doing, emphasized that his staff officer
carried the complete confidence of the Continental Army and
General Washington.

In return, Steuben received promises

of cooperation from Governor Jefferson.
The Virginians likewise responded favorably and his
popularity increased among Virginia officials to the point
that in December 1780, the legislature, while awarding
grants to Continental officers, deeded Steuben fifteen
thousand acres of land "as testimony of the high sense the
General Assembly of Virginia entertained of the important
services

rend~red

the United States by the honourable Major

General Baron Steuben. 112

Then on January 1, 1781, Steuben's

fortunes turned for the worse.
With General Arnold's movement up the James River,
two things happened.

Steuben became so involved with his

secondary mission as commander that he no longer could pursue his primary mission and he failed to maintain a good
relationship with Virginia government officials and instead
substituted an ever-increasing desire to leave _Virginia
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and join General Greene.

This, in turn, seriously ham-

pered his staff as·they continued their efforts to obtain
supplies.
Historians writing of this period of American Revolutionary history point out that Steuben had difficulties
with Virginia officials while in the state and that these
difficulties limited his effectiveness.3

John McAuley

Palmer, one of Steuben's principal biographers, indicates
that this difficulty began when Virginia came under attack
and the Virginia legislators sought to identify a scapegoat
upon whom blame for the success of the British expedition
could be placed. 4

Friedrich Kapp, the other biographer,

also states his opinion of the criticism by the Virginians
by stating that "Steuben has been assailed outrageously •
and particularly by the government

o~

the State.

The joy

of his numerous enemies became apparent when they discovered
one assailable point in him."5
Steuqen, trained as a strict disciplinarian in
the European military style, failed to realize that he
could have alleviated many of his problems by allaying the
suspicion, fear, and doubt of the populace.

If he had

defused this fear and panic in the Virginians and kept
the government aware of events he would have probably
maintained control of the situation.

Instead, Steuben

increased his own anger and resentment which he directed
against the Virginians and turned more toward General
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Greene for relief.

The result was an increase in the

conservatism of the Virginians and a significant loss in
confidence in Steuben's proposals with less support for
his requests for supplies and manpower, particularly to
support the Southern Army.

Steuben's initial success in

meeting his primary mission was now a thing of the past.
Now he would find success more difficult to attain.

The

reputations of his staff now brought more results than
did Steuben's.
Steuben had experience in recruiting troops and
obtaining supplies but he had none as field commander.

In

fact, since he had assumed his current rank when he came
to America, he really had no experience as a general either.
Against the more experienced British generals, Steuben was
at a distinct disadvantage.
In every confrontation between Steuben and the
British there was not a single instance in which he could
not have donG more to try to insure success.
this vary with point of view.

Reasons for

In the biographies of

Steuben, actions he left undone were rationalized as
unnecessary or impractical, when in fact they happened
because he lacked the flexibility to adjust to varied
battlefield conditions, such as at Petersburg and Point of
Fork.

Other books written about this period show Steuben

to be a very conservative commander who made errors of
6 As such, he was not able to exercise innojudgment.
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vative tactics and repeatedly retreated when faced with
pressure by the British instead of trying to achieve the
upper hand.
Steuben was conservative, but this basic conservatism was not unusual, as it was possessed by many
field commanders on both sides.

But in those who were

successful, it was overcome or compensated for, something
Steuben was unable to do.

Further, I believe that his

conservatism came from a reluctance to risk the army or
individuals' lives unnecessarily, an uncertainty about
the capability or reliability of the officers or men, and
a knowledge that replacements of men or supplies could
not be obtained.
In January 1781 Steuben issued instructions to
meet and engage the British, but lack of experience and
conservatism made him slow to follow up to see that they
had been done.

These instructions, if carried out, would

have resulted in confrontations and made General Arnold
abandon his expedition and return downriver, but Steuben
was unable to make this happen.

In February, Steuben's

troops had successfully held Arnold at Portsmouth awaiting the arrival of Lafayette.

This combined force would

have been sufficient to defeat the British if they
had attacked before Arnold was reinforced by Phillips,
but caution and adherence to standard rules of warfare put Arnold's capture beyond reach.

In April, while

a more experienced Steuben fought credibly against
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the British at Petersburg, victory was

a~ain

lost because

defensive rather than offensive tactics were used.

An

alternative attack by Steuben at City Point might have
forced the British to retreat.

Finally, at Point of Fork,

more confidence in his troops and more accurate intelligence, enabling him to know the size of Simcoe's force,
would have opened the way for Steuben to fight instead
of retreat.

In retrospect, virtually any of these en-

counters might have been won if Steuben had offset his
lack of experience and conservatism by finding and pressing
some advantage, either of position,. arms, or surprise ..
By the summer of 1781, Steuben's actions were not
only being seriously challenged by the Virginians but: were
coming to the attention of his own superiors as well.7
On July 10, 1781 George Washington, his staunchest supporter, wrote to Joseph Jones that:

"the complaints

against Baron de Steuben are not more distressing than
unexpected,

~or

good officer. 118

I always viewed him in the light of a
Lafayette also stated that "the hatred

of the Virginians toward him was truly hurtful to the
cause." 9
If it had not been for Steuben's illness, public
opinion might well have forced his removal from Virginia.
As it was, however, he was given one more opportunity to
prove his value to the American cause.

His knowledge of

siege warfare became invaluable at Yorktown and surely
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shortened the period needed to reduce the British defenses.
This was important for with the British fleet coming from
New York swiftness made the difference.
'

In the final analysis, Steuben was no brilliant
tactician or inspired leader of armies.

He was a good

quartermaster officer and teacher who worked tirelessly
to carry out his responsibilities but who found that the
road to "Glory and Great Possessions" was not easy to
travel. 10
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